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Chapter One
Introduction

In this study I will investigate the relationship between special divine action and
science, particularly in relation to quantum mechanics and chaos theory. In the first phase
of my research, I will present the work of John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, and
Alvin Plantinga.1 Each of these authors have made proposals which seek a scientifically
informed model of special divine action that is non-interventionist in that natural laws,
which can be explored scientifically, are not violated. After presenting their proposals I
will assess each of them in order to test their coherence, limitations, and overall
plausibility. Afterwards I will construct a proposal for special divine action that
incorporates the indeterminism found in certain interpretations of scientific theories and
assess its possible strengths and limitations, including its consonance with theological
positions. This project does not intend to prove that God interacts with the world or limit
divine action to only what is scientifically feasible. Instead, it will seek to integrate a
theology of divine action with scientific theories in order to find possible places of
interaction, consonance, and tension. At most, the synthesis will present a minimalist

1

I will also include other authors, particularly those in the Divine Action Project (DAP). DAP was cosponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. This project
consisted of a series of conferences on theology and science that led to the publication of several volumes
on divine action in scientific and theological perspectives. For a summary of the project see Wesley
Wildman, “The Divine Action Project, 1988–2003,” Theology and Science 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2004): 31–75.
A concise presentation of Polkinghorne’s work can be found in John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age
of Science, The Terry Lectures (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 48-75 and Russell’s
proposal in Robert J. Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of
Theology and Science, Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 110-211.
Plantinga’s contribution to the discussion on divine action can be found in Alvin Plantinga, Where the
Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 65125.
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picture of the scope of God’s interaction with the world; it will be incomplete as a
comprehensive model of divine action.

Significance of Non-Interventionist Special Divine Action
This project is important because it seeks to integrate science with a theology of
divine action. This is a significant issue in the intersection of science and theology.
Additionally, what one affirms about how God acts in the world has far-reaching
theological consequences. This discussion is relevant for the coherence of many Christian
practices like prayer; if God does not objectively act in the world then it is incoherent to
pray for God to take special action. This topic also has apologetic value. Historically
many have charged objective divine action with violating known laws of physics (e.g.
David Hume), rendering any kind of belief in special divine action as irrational in a
scientific age. If there are plausible accounts of non-interventionist special divine action,
then one can show that there is nothing incoherent about affirming the regularities of the
natural order while holding that God can interact with the world. This lessens the
argument against divine action from science. If non-interventionist divine action is
plausible then it may shed light on other issues, such as God’s role in guiding creation
throughout its evolutionary history without dictating every outcome. Additionally, a
successful non-interventionist proposal can be a way in which science and theology are in
consonance with one another.

3
The Study’s Relation to Other Inquiries
This study can make a contribution to the discussion of divine action in the science
and religion dialogue in several ways. It is relevant to reconciling creation theology with
cosmological and biological evolution by investigating ways in which God may be able
to guide the development of creation in cooperation, rather than conflict, with natural
causes. It also makes an important contribution to discussions on God’s providence,
possibly presenting another option for how God may interact with the world while
respecting the regularities God has established for creation. This can lead to a more
detailed theology of God’s immanence in the world. There are other issues that will be
addressed peripherally in the study that carry great theological significance. These
include determinism/indeterminism, the nature of time, miracles, and the problem of evil.
While these topics will not be the direct focus of the study, they are related to the
discussion and may be used to assess any model of special divine action to find its
limitations and distinctive characteristics.

Basic Assumptions and Rationale
In this study, my approach for constructing a non-interventionist account of special
divine action will loosely follow Nancey Murphy’s application of Imre Lakatos’s
methodology of scientific research programs to theological views.2 In summary, a
research program consists of a hard core (the program’s central idea), which is

2
Lakatos’s methodology can be found in Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of
Scientific Research Programmes,” in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, ed. John
Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 8-101. Murphy’s application
of Lakatos’s methodology to theology can be found in Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific
Reasoning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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surrounded by auxiliary hypotheses that allow data to be related to the hard core. The
auxiliary hypotheses are successively modified in order to account for observations and
data, but the hard core of the program remains constant. A research program also contains
a negative heuristc, a plan for future development of the program in order to avoid
falsifying the hard core, and a positive heuristic, which “sets out a program for a chain of
ever more complicated models simulating reality.”3 Competing research programs are
evaluated based on a number of criteria, such as their ability to explain a wider range of
observations than their competitors or predict new observations that are empirically
confirmed.
How this kind of approach translates into a theological research program is not
always straightforward.4 I will suppose that Christianity’s central claims (corresponding
to its hard core) are embodied in the Nicene Creed, the Scriptures, and the tradition and
praxis of the church, which presuppose that God acts in the world. God is the Creator of
heaven and earth, providentially guides creation, and acts in miraculous events such as
Jesus’s resurrection. For this study, I will place special divine action as the hard core of
the research program: God interacts with the world in creation, providence, and even
miraculous action at times. Any further details for divine action are placed as auxiliary
hypotheses surrounding the core in order to relate it to the data.5 I will attempt to
construct a non-interventionist proposal for special divine action as part of a positive

3

Murphy, Theology in an Age of Scientific Reasoning, 60.

4

For example, it is not clear what counts as the data to explain (i.e. religious experience, traditions,
texts, or empirical data). There is not a one-to-one correspondence between scientific and theological
research programs. For a further discussion on what counts as data in this approach, see Ibid., 130-173.
5

In this study, I will include Christian tradition (particularly embodied in the Nicene Creed), the
Scriptures, and the life of the church as data to be accounted for. In addition, the data will also include
scientific theories such as quantum mechanics (which must include one of its interpretations).
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heuristic; the proposal seeks an integrated account of special divine action with current
scientific theories. Thus, the hard core that God providentially interacts in the world is
not dependent on the success of the project. At most, it would only be this approach of
relating special divine action and scientific theories that is shown to be unfruitful.
The strategy of developing a non-interventionist model of special divine action is
not intended to be a comprehensive account of how God interacts with the world. It is not
intended to explain everything that God has done, particularly miraculous events or
creation ex nihilo. Instead, it seeks to present a model for how God may interact in
creation and its development without leading to a violation of natural causes as described
by currently accepted scientific theories. This strategy has potential for a degree of
consonance with scientific theories. By consonance, I do not mean that we should expect
there to be a one-to-one correspondence between a theological account of divine action
and scientific theories, or that special divine action can be proven scientifically. If the
non-interventionist proposal is consonant with particular scientific theories (or their
interpretations), then it will integrate the insights gained by the theories in a consistent,
non-trivial way so that the falsification of the theories employed would also falsify the
proposal. Since this approach integrates the findings of scientific theories, the proposal
will be falsified if the underlying scientific theories or interpretations are falsified. This
weakness is intrinsic to the approach. Ideally, the theological and scientific aspects will
not only be consistent, but mutually reinforcing.
I will assume that quantum mechanics and chaos theory are correct descriptions or
approximations of physical systems in their specified domains. The various
interpretations of these theories will need to be discussed because they are relevant for
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constructing a non-interventionist proposal. The nature of physical laws will also need to
be stated; this is too large of an issue to adequately research in the study, but it should
suffice to describe the major schools of thought (such as the strong-ontological and
regularitarian views). The study will also take an incompatibilist approach to divine
action as opposed to a compatibilist approach.

Delimitations
Biblical studies are not a focus of this study. However, Scripture does presume that
God acts in the world in a variety of ways and provides theological justification for belief
in special divine action. Thus, I do not consider this project to be in competition with the
Biblical tradition, but rather a creative theological enterprise. Special divine action raises
issues for understanding the problem of evil and the nature of free will, but I will spend
minimal time addressing these issues. God’s relation to time is relevant, and some space
will be committed to addressing the implications of different options. Other strategies for
developing auxiliary hypotheses surrounding divine action, such as Neo-Thomism and
Process Theology, will not be directly considered due to the constraints of the study. The
focus of the project will be on the proposals of John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell,
and Alvin Plantinga and on constructing a non-interventionist proposal.

Definition of Terms
For the sake of clarity, I will define several theological and philosophical terms. I
define physical determinism as implying a unique evolution for a system; given its initial
conditions and causal relations (described by natural laws) the system can only develop
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in one possible way. I take indeterminism to deny determinism; there is more than one
possible way the system could develop, and the outcome that occurs is not determined by
the initial state of the system in conjunction with natural laws. I define intervention as
divine action which causes an event that otherwise could not have happened given the
natural capacities of the system. General divine action will refer to God’s upholding of
the created order and the natural laws which describe its development. Special divine
action will refer to God’s particular, objective actions that go beyond his general action
in sustaining creation’s existence. Non-interventionist special divine action will refer to
divine action that is non-interventionist in that the outcome was a possibility for how the
system might have developed given that natural processes and natural causes are not
violated.

Methodology and Expected Results
The majority of my research will involve various authors who contributed to the
Divine Action Project (DAP), a joint project between the Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences (CTNS) and the Vatican Observatory. This was a multi-year project
involving the collaboration of an international team of scientists, philosophers, and
theologians between 1990 and 2005.6 It features various scientific perspectives on divine

6

There are five volumes on divine action: Robert J. Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, and C. J. Isham, eds.,
Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action 1, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1996);
Robert J. Russell et al., eds., Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action 2 (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1996); Robert J.
Russell et al., eds., Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action 3 (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1998);
Robert J. Russell, ed., Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action 4 (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1999); Robert J.
Russell the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, and Specola Vaticana eds., Quantum Mechanics,
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action 5 (Berkeley: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2002);
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action and has resulted in a series of books and numerous articles. I will focus on the
topics related to chaos theory and quantum mechanics, which are found throughout the
entire series and in subsequent publications. The DAP maps out the various scientific and
theological issues raised by divine action from multiple viewpoints and contains various
proposals for special divine action that are non-interventionist. I will focus on the
proposals of John Polkinghorne and Robert Russell (other DAP participants who appeal
to quantum mechanics include Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy). I will also include
criticisms of the DAP at appropriate places.7
The DAP addresses many of the underlying issues that involve methodology and
philosophical assumptions. This will be of great assistance in forming a noninterventionist proposal. These issues include: the nature of physical laws,8
interpretations of quantum mechanics, indeterminism, interventionism, and methodology
for integrating science and theology. These are too large to adequately explore in the
study, however they are relevant and so I will need to evaluate the various options. In
chapter five I will investigate the nature of time in order to list the options and their
implications for divine action and divine foreknowledge of indeterminate events. I will
not decisively answer the question of which approach is best.

Robert J. Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, and William R. Stoeger, eds., Scientific Perspectives on Divine
Action: Twenty Years of Challenge and Progress, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action 6 (Berkeley:
Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2008).
7

Examples include Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); Timothy Sansbury, “The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics,” Zygon 42, no. 1
(March 2007): 111–121; Steven D. Crain, “Divine Action in a World Chaos: An Evaluation of John
Polkinghorne’s Model of Special Divine Action,” Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (January 1997): 41–61.
8

That is, whether natural laws are prescriptions of how a system will behave (the strong-ontological
approach) or merely descriptive of the regularities of a system’s behavior (the regularitarian approach).
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This project will consider various interpretations of chaos theory and quantum
mechanics. The interpretation of chaos theory will be addressed in the chapter on John
Polkinghorne’s proposal. It is generally interpreted deterministically due to the
mathematical nature of the nonlinear equations that describe chaotic systems. However,
Polkinghorne interprets it as pointing towards chaotic systems being indeterministic. In
the chapters on Robert John Russell’s and Alvin Plantinga’s approaches I will focus on
the Copenhagen interpretation and objective collapse interpretations of quantum
mechanics respectively. In chapter five, I will also summarize and consider two
deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics and the manyworlds interpretations) and the indeterministic consistent histories interpretation. I will
evaluate these interpretations based on various criteria.
In the sixth chapter, I will construct my proposal by listing it in seven propositions. I
will then apply the proposal to various kinds of possible divine action to examine its
potential as a proposal. Of special interest are the following areas: cosmological history,
biological evolution, mental states, and macroscopic systems (including chaotic systems).
If special divine action is plausible for these aspects (in that they allow for non-trivial
creative input by God to influence the outcome), then the proposal will be of great value
in exploring God’s role in creation history. Finally, I will address whether the proposal
can account for miracles such as parting a sea (as in the Exodus), feeding the five
thousand, Jesus’s resurrection, and the eschatological renewal of creation. It is at the
points of creation ex nihilo and miraculous action that the proposal will break down; the
proposal is only successful as a non-comprehensive account of special divine action.

10
Concluding Remarks
I will state my conclusions in accordance with the results of my research. While the
nature of the investigation will not yield definitive answers for special divine action, I
will fairly state the philosophical, theological, and scientific issues with the various noninterventionist proposals, including my own. I will also suggest possible lines of further
research, possibly including the degree of indeterminism at macro levels allowed in
scientific theories and issues related to eschatology and theodicy. I will do my best to
fairly present my own proposal in relation to other proposals; this includes pointing out
its limitations and possible defeaters. I have no intention to overestimate its value or
claim that it is somehow scientifically provable. At most, it will be a theological
extrapolation from the indeterminism implied by an interpretation of a scientific theory.
Despite these limitations, it may be able to offer a degree of consonance between science
and theology, and that makes it worth pursuing.

Chapter Two
John Polkinghorne, Chaos Theory, and Divine Action

John Polkinghorne is one of the most influential authors within the science and
religion dialogue.1 Throughout his life he has served as a theoretical physicist, Anglican
priest, and theologian. He has argued for the compatibility of science and religion as two
truth-seeking disciplines which may inform each other even though they explore different
subjects. He has written on topics such as creation, providence, eschatology, Scripture,
and divine action. For his work in science and religion he was invited to give the Gifford
Lectures in 1993-1994 and was awarded the Templeton Prize in 2002. In this chapter, I
will summarize Polkinghorne’s account of special divine action, present the criticisms
that have been directed against it, and briefly assess the plausibility of his proposal as a
non-interventionist account of special divine action.
In exploring the possibilities of divine action, there are a number of strategies
Polkinghorne wishes to avoid.2 He rejects a timeless deism in which God only upholds
the universe because of its conflict with the religious practice of petitionary prayer. He
similarly rejects God as only active through influence on conscious beings, as it makes
God inactive for most of the universe’s history. He then considers process theology with
God’s action described as persuasion, but likewise finds it inadequate because it
diminishes God’s guidance of creation, and thus the foundation of hope for the future

1
For his autobiography, see John Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography,
(London: SPCK, 2007).
2

See John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, The Terry Lectures (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1998), 54–58.
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fulfillment of creation anticipated in the resurrection of Jesus.3 Polkinghorne also finds
analogies comparing God’s action to human action, in which God is seen as embodied in
the universe similar to how humans are embodied, to be problematic. The universe does
not appear to be an organism, and such an embodiment would make God subject to the
changes of the universe’s history, including its decay, just as humans are subject to their
own bodies. Finally, Polkinghorne considers the position of Austin Farrer, who argued
that it is wrong to attempt to find a causal joint of divine action because it is beyond the
ability of human reason. Instead, Farrer argues that divine action should be spoken of in
terms of God’s primary agency at work through secondary causes. However,
Polkinghorne believes this “to be a fideistic evasion of the problem.” 4

Chaos and Ontological Indeterminism
Polkinghorne’s strategy to develop an account of special divine action is to appeal to
natural processes that are ontologically indeterministic. That is, there are a number of
different outcomes given the same initial state; this randomness and inherent
unpredictability must be intrinsic to the system itself and not a reflection of our ignorance
about the system.5 Polkinghorne wants to construct a scientifically informed account of
divine action in which God is causally at work within the processes he has created and

The resurrection is another point in which Polkinghorne diverges from process theology; “To put it
bluntly, the God of process theology does not seem to be the God who raised Jesus from the dead.” John
Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1996), 68. However, Polkinghorne does believe there are valuable insights in process theology, such as
God’s real engagement with time. For more on Polkinghorne’s view on process theology, see ibid., 65-68.
3

4
Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 58. Polkinghorne recognizes that any proposal for
a causal joint of divine action is by necessity speculative. However, “the demand for an integrated account
of both theological and scientific insight impels us to the task.” Ibid., 59
5

Ibid., 59
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maintains, as frequent interventionist action does not respect the integrity of natural
processes (leading to a kind of theological inconsistency).6 While Polkinghorne does not
expect that one can always find a direct correspondence between scientific theories and
theological convictions, he does believe there can be a consonance between the two.
Polkinghorne considers two scientific theories that seem to be intrinsically unpredictable
in this way: quantum physics and chaos theory.
Polkinghorne believes the intrinsically unpredictable outcomes of quantum
measurements, which in the Copenhagen interpretation involve the collapse of the wave
function, are fundamentally indeterministic and notes that many have attempted to argue
for special divine action at the quantum level. However, he rejects quantum physics as a
fruitful approach to divine action for several reasons.7 First, even if the results of a
measurement event may be indeterministic, the development of the system described by
the Schrödinger equation is continuous and deterministic until a measurement is made.
This limits any ontological indeterminism only to particular events which collapse the
wave function. This implies that God’s special actions at the quantum level would only
be episodic. Second, there is the issue of amplification: is the scope of quantum
indeterminacy enough to significantly impact how a macroscopic system develops? Are
there ways to amplify the small effects of quantum events onto macroscopic scales that
leave enough openness for God to respond to prayers or providentially guide the world
without violating natural laws? In order to answer these questions, Polkinghorne believes

6

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist, 79-80.

See John Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” in Philosophy, Science and Divine
Action, eds. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV,
2009), 103–104; Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 59–60.
7
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quantum theory must be successfully combined with chaos theory, but how these two
theories relate is disputed. Finally, the interpretation of quantum theory is a matter of
intense debate without consensus. Since there are deterministic variations, such as
Bohmian mechanics, quantum theory does not establish ontological indeterminism.8 Until
these issues are resolved, Polkinghorne remains skeptical that quantum physics offers a
successful basis for special divine action.
Given his concerns for special divine action and quantum theory, Polkinghorne turns
to chaos theory to form his account of special divine action. In chaos theory, a dynamical
system is described by nonlinear equations, in which a change in a variable does not
necessarily lead to a proportional change in the state of the system (this change may be
exponential or geometric). An implication of these equations is sensitive dependence on
initial conditions (SDIC); a small change in the initial conditions of the system can lead
to a disproportionately large change in the evolution of the system. The evolution of a
chaotic system is typically modelled in a mathematically constructed space in which each
point corresponds to a possible state that the system could be in; this is called state space
(in the case where the state space consists of position and momentum, it is often called a
phase space).9 The equations that describe the evolution of the system are deterministic
in that they have a unique evolution, which implies that a “given state of a model is
always followed by the same history of state transitions.”10 That is, the equations describe

8

John Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science and Theology,
(Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), 40–41.
9
For example, a state space may include three position components (x, y, and z), three momentum
components for each direction (px, py, and pz), and the temperature (T) as a function of position (the x, y,
and z components). This would create a seven-dimensional state space to describe the system.

Bishop, “Chaos.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University, February 18, 2017,
10
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the trajectory that a given system will take through state space given the initial conditions
(the trajectory represents the states the system will have over time) and none of the
trajectories will intersect (if they did, the equations would not be deterministic as there
would no longer be a unique evolution from the point where two trajectories intersect). In
the case where a collection of points in the state space (and the trajectories that follow
deterministically from them) approach another point or region in the state space, that
point or region is called an attractor. An important class of attractors are called strange
attractors. Strange attractors have a fractal structure; they are self-similar and scale-free,
which implies a number of interesting features:
Magnify any small portion of the attractor and you would find that the magnified
portion would look identical to the regular-sized region. Magnify the magnified
region and you would see the identical structure repeated again. Continuous
repetition of this process would yield the same results. The self-similar structure is
repeated on arbitrarily small scales. An important geometric implication of selfsimilarity is that there is no inherent size scale so that we can take as large a
magnification of as small a region of the attractor as we want and a statistically
similarly structure will be repeated.11
The majority of scientists and philosophers interpret chaos theory deterministically,
as the equations themselves are deterministic and part of classical physics, but
Polkinghorne thinks chaos theory is an approximation of a deeper, ontologically
indeterministic reality. A nonlinear system is intrinsically unpredictable in precise detail
(although not completely random) due to SDIC. Polkinghorne’s critical realism leads him
to connect epistemology and ontology; one’s knowledge of reality is to be taken as a

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/chaos/. “A model can be studied in state space by
following its trajectory from the initial state to some chosen final state. The evolution equations govern the
path—the history of state transitions—of the system in state space.” Ibid.
Ibid. These features of strange attractors form a central part of John Polkinghorne’s proposal for
special divine action.
11
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(generally) reliable guide to what is the case. Applying this principle to chaotic systems,
he concludes that their unpredictability points towards an indeterministic nature.12
Polkinghorne recognizes that his interpretation of chaos theory as indeterministic is
not one that is forced; it is a metaphysical decision based on the character of our
knowledge of nonlinear systems. Polkinghorne defends his interpretation by first
recognizing the mathematically deterministic nature of the equations describing nonlinear
systems.13 From there, Polkinghorne appeals to certain characteristics of strange
attractors. Since strange attractors are a special case in which the attractor has a fractal
structure, they are scale free and thus can be tightly folded so that different trajectories
with the same energy can become arbitrarily close around the strange attractor (although
the trajectories will later diverge). The arbitrarily close trajectories will become infinitely
close to overlapping.14 Thus, the strange attractors provide a constraint on the trajectories
of a system through phase space and they arise mathematically from the deterministic
equations describing the system.
From a chaotic system with SDIC and a strange attractor constraining its trajectories
through phase space, Polkinghorne proposes that the deterministic equations used in

John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (London: SPCK,
1989), 28–29; Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality, 41–45.
12

For a critical summary of Polkinghorne’s argument for indeterminism from chaos theory, see
Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 187–195; Steven D. Crain, “Divine Action in a World Chaos: An Evaluation of John Polkinghorne’s
Model of Special Divine Action,” Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (January 1997): 45–46; and Robert J.
Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and Science,
Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 129–132.
13

14
See Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science, 193-195. Saunders points out that this detail is
not widely appreciated in evaluations of Polkinghorne’s proposal. If the system is deterministic, then
trajectories can never cross. Polkinghorne’s proposal interprets the fact that these trajectories become
arbitrarily close around strange attractors as pointing towards that the actual trajectories of equal energy
taken by the system can cross, making the system indeterministic.
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chaos theory are only approximations. The mathematical models are not to be mistaken
for the real systems:
Accordingly, I return to the question of whether some of the characteristics
discerned in low level exploration of the world (basic physics) may not be regarded
as emergent at that level, so that they need not be made universally prescriptive for
metaphysics. To address the issue bluntly: if apparently open behavior is associated
with underlying deterministic equations, which is to be taken to have greater
ontological seriousness – the behavior or the equations? Which is the approximation
and which is the reality? It is conceivable that apparent determinism emerges at
some lower levels without its being a characteristic of reality overall. For instance it
might arise from the approximation of treating subsystems as if they were isolatable
from the whole, which in fact they are not, as subsequent discussion will show. 15
Polkinghorne thus takes the mathematically deterministic equations describing the
behavior of chaotic systems as an approximation to the real systems that are ontologically
indeterministic. Thus Polkinghorne’s proposal for ontological indeterminism does not
deny the deterministic structure of the equations used to describe chaotic systems. In fact,
his proposal depends on the sensitive dependence and constraints found in strange
attractors that arise from the deterministic equations. However, he takes these equations
as an approximation of the holistic,16 indeterministic nature of reality.
Polkinghorne then makes a further proposal about the nature of this underlying
indeterminism. He sees the strange attractor and conservation of energy as constraints on
the possibilities of how a system might develop. The trajectories through phase space
must be equal in energy in order for energy to be conserved; anything causing the system
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality, 41.
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Belief in God in an Age of Science, 64.
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to take one trajectory rather than another cannot be in the form of energetic causation.
Polkinghorne calls this kind of causation active information:
The discriminating factor is the structure of their future history, which we can
understand as corresponding to different inputs of information that specify its
character (this way, not that way)… Thus a realist interpretation of the
epistemological unpredictabilities of chaotic systems leads to the hypothesis of an
ontological openness within which new causal principles may be held to be
operating which determine the pattern of future behaviour and which are of an
holistic character.17
Polkinghorne defines active information as representing “the influence that brings about
the formation of a structured pattern of future dynamical behaviour.”18 His proposal of
the concept of information as a different form of causality is a speculative leap, but it is
one that Polkinghorne believes to be metaphysically supported because of the human
intuition of openness (such as in free will or in the religious experience of prayer) and
because it might be supported by further scientific advancement:
We shall see that this development strongly encourages the expectation that, as
twenty-first-century science progresses, the idea of active information, acting in a
top-down fashion to produce ordered patterns of dynamical behavior, will come to
stand alongside the bottom-up operation of energy in providing a pair of
foundational concepts necessary for an adequate understanding of the causal
character of the world.19

17

Ibid., 62.
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Ibid., 65. The input of active information can then be understood as directing the trajectory taken by
the system through the possible trajectories while staying within the constraints of energy conservation and
the strange attractor. Saunders summarizes this aspect of Polkinghorne’s proposal: “This infinitely tight
folding is depicted by a fractal structure, and ‘deep inside’ the attractor itself, in the infinite limit, these
trajectories become arbitrarily close. It is at this point, and only at this point (the infinite limit), that
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Active Information and Divine Action
It is within this scheme of ontological openness and active information as a kind of
causation that Polkinghorne conceives special divine action. Polkinghorne proposes that
God’s providential interaction with creation is not through energetic causation, since God
is not embodied in creation,20 but through the input of active information. This kind of
action is intentional, particular, and efficacious within the openness allowed by the
natural regularities of the created order. This input of information acts in a top-down
fashion; this creates a contrast with the bottom-up approaches to special divine action that
appeal to quantum theory.21 In Polkinghorne’s proposal, God is not one agent among
others that interact energetically in creation; “Instead, form is given to the possibility that
he influences his creation in a non-energetic way.”22
Polkinghorne’s proposal thus avoids the deistic and process views of God.23 God’s
action is objective, efficacious, and respects the freedom of creation (thus avoiding
placing God as an all-determining cosmic tyrant). Instead, Polkinghorne situates his
account of divine action within a Trinitarian theology:

20

There are some similarities with how Polkinghorne conceives divine and human action, except that
he understands human as acting energetically in addition to informationally. As humans we are able to act
energetically because we are embodied; God acts by the input of information even though he is not
embodied in creation, see Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 63. However, it should be
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It also seems fair to say that a world of that kind would also be one within whose
open process one could conceive of the Spirit as being continuously at work through
the input of pure information into its unfolding history. This would constitute a
pneumatological account of continuous creation, divine participation in the evolving
fruitfulness of the world, exercised with covert reticence within the open grain of
nature. There is no implication here of the theologically problematic idea of the
Creator acting against the God-given character of the created world.24
The Father is the fundamental ground of creation’s being, while the Word is the
source of creation’s deep order and the Spirit is ceaselessly at work within the
contingencies of open history. The fertile interplay of order and openness, operating
at the edge of chaos, can be seen to reflect the activities of Word and Spirit, the two
divine Persons that Irenaeus called ‘the hands of God’.25
The Triune God may act in unique and novel ways as new circumstances unfold. God
faithfully maintains the regularities of the created order, but this does not condemn God
to the sidelines of cosmic history.
Polkinghorne’s account of divine action is also situated within his views of divine
omnipotence, omniscience, and eternality. He accepts temporal becoming as an objective
feature of the universe; time really flows and the future is not yet determined.26 God’s
interaction and relation with the world must be understood in light of this temporal nature
of reality. Polkinghorne believes that God must have a real engagement with time,
implying that God does not yet know the unformed future because God has perfect
knowledge of creation in its unfolding. This does not imply an imperfection in God’s
omniscience, as the future cannot be known in its entirety because it has not yet been

Polkinghorne, “The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos,” 178. This kind of action would always be
hidden within the openness of indeterministic processes. Divine action by the input of active information
must be discerned by faith rather than by scientific experiment.
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formed. In this view, God’s actions are like the actions of a chess grand master who is
assured of victory not through the unfolding of an all-determined plan but a master
improviser whose plans will certainly come to fruition because of his faithfulness and
wisdom. In creating a world of true becoming and not determining everything that
occurs, God has placed a self-limitation on his foreknowledge to allow the created order
to be itself and have true spontaneity and creativity. 27
For Polkinghorne, just as God has placed a self-limitation on his omniscience, God
has also self-limited his omnipotence in that he does not determine everything that
happens. Polkinghorne affirms creation ex nihilo; the entire universe at every point in
time depends on the will of God for its existence. God not only holds the world in being,
he also creatively interacts within its unfolding processes. God could determine all that
happens, but Polkinghorne does not believe God has done so. Instead, God allows the
universe the freedom to grow and to make itself while he continually interacts within it
through the input of information (thus maintaining the freedom God gave to creation). In
Polkinghorne’s picture:
God interacts with the world but is not in total control of all its process. The act of
creation involves divine acceptance of the risk of the existence of the other, and
there is a consequent kenosis of God’s omnipotence. This curtailment of divine
power is, of course, through self-limitation on his part and not through any intrinsic
resistance in the creature. It arises from the logic of love, which requires the
freedom of the beloved. God’s acquiescent will is part of every event, for if he did
not hold the world in being there would be no such event at all, but his purposive
will is not fulfilled in everything that happens. God remains omnipotent in the sense
that he can do whatever he wills, but it is not in accordance with his will and nature
to insist on total control. I also believe that endowing his creation with the power of
true becoming, God has permitted a kenosis of his omniscience, parallel to the
kenosis of his omnipotence. Even he does not know the unformed future, and that is
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no imperfection in the divine nature, for that future is not yet there to be known. The
adoption of this view requires us to take God’s temporality very seriously. 28
It is this view of God’s action in the world that serves as the basis for Polkinghorne’s
free-process defense for the problem of evil.29 God allows the universe to be itself, as a
world of free beings is better than a world of deterministic machines. “God no more
expressly wills the growth of a cancer than he expressly wills the act of a murderer, but
he allows both to happen. He is not the puppetmaster of either men or matter.” 30

Evaluation
The most common objection to Polkinghorne’s proposal centers on his interpretation
of chaos theory as suggesting ontological indeterminism. In physics, chaos theory is
typically understood deterministically as the equations are mathematically deterministic.
The epistemological unpredictability of chaotic systems is not necessarily a characteristic
of indeterminism, as it is also a necessary characteristic of the deterministic nonlinear
equations modelling them. That is, the deterministic features of these equations implies
the observed unpredictability in principle, although theoretically a greater knowledge of
initial conditions can improve predictability. Robert Bishop notes that:
Giving a critical realist reading of epistemology and ontology, Polkinghorne seeks
to link the epistemological barrier with an ontological failure of determinism
because of ontological openness to influences not fully accounted for in our physics
descriptions. Nevertheless, the mathematical properties of dynamical systems (e.g.,
their deterministic character) present a serious problem with this line of reasoning.
Determinism as unique evolution appears to be preserved in our mathematical
models of chaos, which serve as our ontic descriptions of chaotic systems.31
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Nancey Murphy also finds Polkinghorne’s move from the structure of our knowledge of
chaotic systems to an assertion about the ontological nature of those systems to be
dubious. She argues that instead chaos theory shows that there must be “a more careful
distinction between predictability (an epistemological concept) and causal determinism
(an ontological concept).”32 Furthermore, Polkinghorne’s account makes a strong appeal
to strange attractors, which are themselves features of the deterministic equations
modeling the system. It is unclear that one can separate strange attractors from the
deterministic equations which underlie them.
Steven Crain critiques Polkinghorne’s assumptions and proposal as theologically
misguided.33 Whereas Polkinghorne sees interventionism as problematic because it
threatens the integrity of the natural order and raises issues for theodicy, Crain does not
believe these are sufficient reasons to reject interventionist action. Crain argues that
science can only apply to the general behavior of the universe; it does not have to be able
to explain every single event. If one event is not explainable by science (i.e. a miracle)
then the scientific endeavor as a whole is not threatened. It is only if divine intervention
occurs frequently at large scales that a tension with science appears. Additionally,
miracles need not be conceived as necessarily violating the freedom of creation.34 Crain,
in addition to questioning whether chaotic systems are really indeterministic, also thinks

Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat,” in
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Polkinghorne’s proposal implies a kind a divine embodiment in or emergence from the
physical world. Crain understands Polkinghorne’s proposal as a top-down approach in
which causality flows downwards from the holistic system into the microsystem on
which it depends. This implies a kind of ontological dependence of the whole on the parts
and a kind of embodiment in order for such a causal interplay to be possible. This would
make God ontologically dependent on the world, which Polkinghorne explicitly rejects.35
Crain also objects to Polkinghorne’s project to ground divine action in a
scientifically discoverable physical theory that allows for indeterministic processes. If
this quest is taken as a necessary criteria for the plausibility of divine action, then belief
in divine action is put at risk. It also makes God’s very being and power depend, in some
sense, on the physical nature of the world; those who accept creation ex nihilo must
therefore reject such a project. Instead,
The alternative is to recognize that because the divine act of creation itself is not a
physical act, i.e., one that presupposes pre-existing material, but rather a bringing
forth ex nihilo of all that exists outside of God, then the causal joint between God
and the world is metaphysical in nature, located “behind” or “under” the physical
world open to scientific investigation… For I believe that the claim that God
transcends the world as its creator renders highly suspect attempts like
Polkinghorne’s to argue that God must exploit a built-in physical feature of the
world in order to act in the world. Hence, no discovery about the mode of causation
obtaining in a given kind of physical system can put belief in divine action at risk.36
Since this objection is against the whole project of searching for a non-interventionist
account of divine action by appealing to indeterminate natural processes, it does not
exclusively apply to Polkinghorne’s model. Given Polkinghorne’s comments on Farrer’s
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warnings against pursuing a causal joint, it is likely that Polkinghorne would see this
objection as a fideistic retreat from theological discourse with the science.
Nicholas Saunders notes that Polkinghorne’s proposal is based on conjecture from
chaos theory. Polkinghorne’s proposal depends on the coherence and reality of active
information as a causal influence in the world. This concept of active information is
based on the strange attractors that lead to an infinite complexity of trajectories with
equal energy. However, Saunders points out that there are difficulties in applying the
trajectories to an infinite limit, particularly in chemical systems described by chaotic
models. It is questionable that the fractal structure of trajectories in phase space can be
applied to nature in the way needed for Polkinghorne’s proposal to be viable.37
Polkinghorne recognizes that his proposal is a tentative one that depends on further
research into the concept of holistic chaos. He freely admits he does not offer a
comprehensive account of divine action, but only “a glimmer of how it might be that we
execute our willed intentions and how God exercises providential interaction with
creation.”38 Robert John Russell notes that in his interpretation of Polkinghorne’s
proposal, Polkinghorne seems to go the opposite direction of science to philosophy to
theology. Instead, it appears that Polkinghorne goes from the theological and experiential
basis for openness to suggest a new philosophical and scientific research program for
holistic chaos. Russell notes that if this research program is vindicated by later research
then it could constitute a new ground for special divine action that is non-interventionist
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and that it would be located in the context of emergence.39 Russell encourages the pursuit
of holistic chaos, but he concludes that “lateral causality based on existing chaos theory
fails to provide a successful candidate for NIODA.”40

Concluding Remarks
While I do believe Polkinghorne’s proposal for divine action is a possible candidate
for a non-interventionist view of special divine action, I do not think it is a compelling
model given the current understanding of chaotic systems. As a potential research
program for holistic chaos, I concur with Russell that Polkinghorne’s proposal is worthy
of pursuit and may be vindicated by advances in the scientific and philosophical
understandings of chaotic systems. However, due to the mathematically deterministic
structure of the equations describing chaotic systems, the potential issues with the fractal
structure of strange attractors, and the concept of active information, the proposal is too
speculative in regards to its appeal to scientific theory. The very features Polkinghorne
understands as pointing towards an indeterministic view of chaotic system are dependent
on mathematically deterministic equations. Again, Polkinghorne’s appeal is subtle and
based on a metaphysical choice to take the deterministic aspects of chaotic dynamics as
only an approximation of indeterministic systems. As such, it cannot be easily dismissed.
Perhaps further research in the relation between chaos theory and potential quantum
indeterminacy will also be relevant to the future understanding of chaotic systems and
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potentially divine action.41 But the current scientific understanding of chaotic systems
does not seem to offer a compelling reason to think that these systems are indeterministic.
Polkinghorne’s proposal is too speculative in its physics and philosophical underpinnings
to be the basis of an account of non-interventionist special divine action that seeks
consonance with science.

41
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Chapter Three
Robert John Russell, Quantum Mechanics, and
Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action

Robert John Russell is well known for his contributions to the interaction of science
and theology, cosmology and creation, natural theodicy, and eschatology. 1 He founded
the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) in Berkeley, through which he
has helped facilitate and encourage further dialogue in science and theology. He is also
well-known for his work on Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action (NIODA). It is
his proposal for NIODA which I will focus on, particularly on his application of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will also include brief overviews of
similar proposals for Quantum NIODA from Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy.

The Project of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action
Russell defines the goals, terminology, and methodology for the constructive project
of NIODA in Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega.2 Russell begins by providing an
overview of the history of divine action after the rise of science in the seventeenth and

1
For an overview of Russell’s contributions to science and theology, see Ted Peters, “Robert John
Russell’s Contribution to the Theology & Science Dialogue,” in God’s Action in Nature’s World: Essays in
Honour of Robert John Russell, eds. Ted Peters and Nathan Hallanger (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 1–18.
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revised version of Robert John Russell, “Does ‘The God Who Acts’ Really Act?: New Approaches to
Divine Action in Light of Science,” Theology Today 54, no. 1 (April 1997): 43–65. A more concise version
of Russell’s work on NIODA and quantum mechanics can be found in Robert John Russell, “Quantum
Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist Objective Divine Action,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Religion and Science, eds. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),
579–595.
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eighteenth centuries.3 The mathematical structure of classical mechanics is deterministic4
and has often been taken as depicting “a causally closed universe with little, if any, room
for God’s special action in specific events – and then only by intervention.”5 This creates
a picture of God winding up the universe like a clock to watch it unfold in deterministic
fashion, and has strong consonance with deism. Conceiving of special divine action in
classical physics thus leads to two different approaches, which Russell describes as the
objective and subjective approaches.
He describes the objective approach as interventionist because in it God acts in ways
that have real physical consequences, but these actions must also violate natural laws. In
this approach, God’s special action plays a causal role in which the resulting event would
not have occurred in the way that it did if God had not acted. The subjective approach
(often associated with Liberal Protestantism) rolls creation and providence into one;
special divine action is only perceived subjectively. 6 Russell quotes Schleiermacher’s
definition of a miracle as an example of this position: “Every event, even the most natural
and usual, becomes a miracle, as soon as the religious view of it can be the dominant.”7
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Neither option seems appealing: either God can act in special ways that are contrary to
the natural, created order of the world or God’s special actions are only perceived as a
matter of personal piety.
Even though the theological conversation on divine action has often operated within
this framework, science itself has undergone radical changes. The paradigms of classical
physics have been replaced by new theories that include Einstein’s theory of relativity,
the structure of DNA, Big Bang cosmology, quantum mechanics, and the Standard Model
of particle physics. These changes bring in new considerations for understanding God’s
role in creation, providence, and potentially for understanding divine action. According to
Russell, the possibility of interpreting some theories, particularly quantum mechanics, as
ontologically indeterministic allows for a third option in which God’s special actions do
not violate natural laws (as described by science). He calls it Non-Interventionist
Objective Divine Action (NIODA) in that God’s actions are objective (they have real
causal efficacy unlike the subjective view) and do not require God to violate natural laws
in order to act. The purpose of this approach is to avoid the pitfalls of the subjective and
interventionist approaches of divine action and give an active role to God in the
continuing development of creation’s history. Russell believes that much of the
discussion on divine action in the twentieth century took place without considering these
new insights from physics or the possibility of NIODA.8
Russell defines a number of key terms for NIODA in order for its claims to be
clearly stated.9 First, the laws of nature are defined as the regularities of natural processes
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as described mathematically in scientific theories. Russell views the laws of nature as
descriptive of the regularities of natural entities and processes rather than in the
prescriptive, strong ontological sense. Furthermore, our scientific understanding and
descriptions of natural laws are always revisable. Second, NIODA requires that at least
one of the laws of nature be interpretable in an ontologically indeterministic way. Russell
defines ontological indeterminism as “the philosophical interpretation of nature according
to which there may not always be an efficient physical cause for every effect.” 10 He
recognizes that ultimately it is a matter of interpretation that a decision is made on
whether nature is indeterministic; it is not a necessary consequence of the science in
itself. Thus, the existence of other deterministic interpretations of the same theory (as in
the case with quantum mechanics) does not defeat the project of NIODA as all scientific
theories can be interpreted in multiple ways.11
Russell makes a distinction between direct and indirect actions. A direct act is one
that the “agent accomplishes without having to perform any prior act” and an indirect act
is one which the “agent accomplishes by setting into motion a sequence of events
stemming from a direct act.”12 He also distinguishes between mediated and unmediated
divine action. He uses mediated to refer to God acting “in, with, and through the existing
processes of nature without thereby becoming a secondary, or natural, cause,” and
unmediated to “mean God’s action of creation ex nihilo which accounts for the
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ontological existence of the world as a whole and for the existence of the world at every
moment of time.”13
With the necessary terms defined, Russell then describes the criteria needed for a
successful model of NIODA:
For non-interventionist objective divine action to be intelligible in light of science,
the events that result from God’s action must occur within a domain of nature in
which the appropriate scientific theory can be interpreted philosophically in terms
of ontological indeterminism. The events must be considered as direct, mediated,
and objective acts of God.14
He then addresses a number of common concerns raised against the project of NIODA.15
NIODA is not an attempt at natural theology to somehow prove that God acts. Instead, it
is developed as part of a theology of nature that is justified by theological rather than
scientific reasons. Neither does Russell consider NIODA to be a description of the causal
joint between God and created agents. NIODA attempts to describe a possible way in
which God’s direct acts (unknowable in themselves) affect a natural event without
violating scientific laws. God’s direct acts are also different from natural causes as there
are no sufficient natural causes for the event to have its particular outcome; God acts with
nature to produce the outcome. Russell also distinguishes between NIODA and miracles.
He points out that many miracles, such as the resurrection, are a different type of divine
action altogether since they include a transformation of the matter involved in the act.
NIODA is not intended to describe traditional miraculous events. Furthermore, NIODA is
not a “God of the gaps” proposal since the scientific theories used for NIODA are
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interpreted as ontologically indeterministic. That is, the interpretation’s character is such
that it implies nature is indeterministic and thus any new scientific theory which implies
determinism must falsify the earlier theory or its indeterministic interpretations.

Quantum NIODA: A Bottom-Up Approach to Special Divine Action
Russell considers various proposals for non-interventionist divine action. He
classifies Polkinghorne’s proposal as a lateral approach in that the effects lie at the same
epistemic level as their causes (i.e. at the level of chaotic systems). However, he does not
think the current understanding of chaos theory is a plausible candidate for NIODA due
to its mathematically deterministic structure.16 Russell then considers top-down causality,
which refers to how actions at a higher phenomenological level affect actions at lower
levels (e.g. the mind-body problem; one possibility is that God’s action at the higher,
irreducible level of mind affects the lower level of neurons in the brain).17 He also
considers Arthur Peacocke’s proposal, in which God may interact with the world-as-awhole as a kind of boundary condition which does not intervene in the natural order in
the sense of violating laws, but nevertheless has real effects.18 However, Russell finds
applying Peacocke’s proposal to modern science to be problematic because in
contemporary cosmology the universe does not appear to have boundary in the way that
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Peacocke envisions.19 Considering the difficulties of lateral and top-down approaches to
divine action given current science, Russell finds a bottom-up approach (how actions at
lower levels affect higher phenomenological levels of organization) based on quantum
theory to be the most promising.20 In the following, I will briefly describe the necessary
concepts of quantum mechanics for Russell’s NIODA proposal based on the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, particles (e.g. an electron)
are described by a wave function, a mathematical representation of the state of the
particle (e.g. an electron’s position or momentum). Particles can manifest different
properties; sometimes they behave like waves and other times like particles
(wave/particle duality). Multiple states, which can be mutually exclusive in classical
physics, can be added together into a single state; the wave function then describes a state
of superposition (however, the ontological nature of whatever the wave function
corresponds to is debated). The time evolution of the wave function in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics is deterministically described by the Schrödinger equation. When a
measurement21 is made on the system, the wave function, from a state of superposition,
collapses indeterministically into one of the allowed states with a probability given by the
Born Rule. An implication of quantum theory is that there are intrinsic limitations to what
can be measured simultaneously. For example, the observables (which can be any
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quantity of the system that can be measured) of position and momentum cannot be
measured simultaneously; this is part of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Russell adopts a version of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in
order to explore the possibilities of divine action at the quantum level. He addresses some
of the philosophical issues that arise with the Copenhagen interpretation such as the
measurement problem, quantum events, and the collapse of the wave function. In
particular, his approach is focused on what sort of quantum events constitute
measurements and in what sense nature is ontologically indeterministic in this
interpretation. First, even though measurements include what takes place in a measuring
device in a laboratory, they are not limited to these events. Instead, a measurement is
understood to be any quantum event that includes an irreversible interaction between the
quantum system with other systems. Before the measurement, the wave function Ψ that
describes the quantum system can exist in an indeterminate superposition of states (which
in classical physics would be mutually exclusive) and develops deterministically
according to the Schrödinger equation. In an irreversible interaction, the Schrödinger
equation no longer governs the development of the wave function Ψ, and Ψ collapses
from the indeterminate superposition of states into a determinate state. It is any event that
leads to this collapse of the wave function that Russell defines as a measurement.
Examples include: classical measuring devices (such as a Geiger counter), absorption of
photons by the retina, and the breaking of molecular bonds (which are relevant for
genetic mutations). Under his approach, quantum events that constitute measurements do
not require the presence of conscious observers or measuring devices.23
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Second, Russell does not locate ontological indeterminism in the Schrödinger
equation, which is mathematically deterministic. Instead, it is only the outcomes of
measurement events, in which the wave function irreversibly collapses, that are
indeterministic. The outcome of such quantum events are not determined by the
Schrödinger equation. Only the probabilities for each outcome can be calculated by using
the Born Rule. In the Copenhagen interpretation, the actual outcome is not determined by
any natural law because there are no sufficient natural causes for the precise outcome
that does occur. This indeterminism is not a deficiency in the theory or a result of lack of
knowledge of the system; it is an irreducible part of physical reality in the Copenhagen
interpretation. Russell summarizes this version of the Copenhagen interpretation:
A quantum event is an irreversible interaction (at all scales in physics from micromicro to micro-macro), in which the Schrödinger equation ceases to govern the
time-evolution of the wave function Ψ describing both the system and that with
which it irreversibly interacts. Instantaneously Ψ collapses from a superposition of
states to one state. The fact that the resulting state is unpredictable in advance, that
is, that it cannot be explained by a deterministic law, is the basis for the
philosophical interpretation that such an event is ontologically indeterministic. In
short, we find both the determinism described by the Schrödinger equation between
quantum events and the indeterminism characterizing quantum events. In the
following I shall refer to “ontological indeterminism” in the strict sense as referring
to quantum events.24
With the nature of quantum ontological indeterminism defined according to this
version of the Copenhagen interpretation, we can now describe how Russell conceives of
special divine action at the quantum level. God created and sustains the universe ex nihilo
and endowed it with a natural causality described by quantum theory which is
ontologically indeterministic. Since the intrinsic, natural causality of these indeterministic
quantum events only have the necessary, material, and formal causes (but not a sufficient
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cause) for the specific outcome of the collapse of the wave function, God can act together
with nature, in accordance with quantum laws, in order to bring about the particular
outcome of the quantum event. This action is non-interventionist in that God does not
suspend the fundamental, intrinsic natural causality of creation in order to act. God does
not create causal gaps which make room for divine action; instead, God cooperates with
created entities in order to produce the particular outcome so that God acts in a direct
and mediated way.25
Russell addresses the concern that this kind of action would place God as one
natural cause among others. He argues that since there are no sufficient natural causes for
the specific outcome of a quantum event, God’s action remains an entirely different sort
from natural causes: “If God acts together with nature to produce the event in which a
radioactive nucleus decays, God is not acting as a natural cause.”26 God’s action is
mediated as he acts in, with, and through the existing processes of nature without
becoming a secondary or natural cause. According to Russell, we cannot ultimately
understand how God acts because the nature of divine causality is so radically different
from what we can experience directly. Instead, Russell proposes to refer to events “as the
locus of the effect of God’s action rather than as the effect of God’s action.”27
An additional question in this account of Quantum NIODA is the scope of divine
action. Particularly, is God’s special action at the quantum level active in only some
quantum events or in all quantum events? There are different ways an account of
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Quantum NIODA can approach this issue, which must consider further metaphysical and
theological issues such as the principle of sufficient reason and theodicy. Two other
Quantum NIODA proposals have been made by Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy
which address this issue in differing ways. Since Russell draws upon their work, I will
summarize the nuances that each makes in regards to divine action at the quantum level.
Nancey Murphy’s proposal28 seeks to meet a number of theological and scientific
requirements. Theologically, it should make sense of the traditional claim that God
sustains all things and “cooperates with and governs all created entities”29 while leaving
open the possibility of special divine action without unnecessarily expanding the problem
of evil. Scientifically, the account of divine action cannot subvert scientific explanation
or practice. It should also respect the autonomy and regularity of natural processes,
preserving the consistent, law-like evolution of macroscopic objects:
In addition to creation and sustenance, God has two modes of action within the
created order: one at the quantum level… and the other through human intelligence
and action. The apparently random events at the quantum level all involve (but are
not exhausted by) specific, intentional acts of God. First, God respects the integrity
of the entities with which he cooperates – there are some things that God can do
with an electron, for instance, and many other things that he cannot (e.g., make it
have the rest-mass of a proton, or a positive charge). Second, within the wider range
of effects allowed by God’s action in and through sub-atomic entities, God restricts
his action in order to produce a world that for all we can tell is orderly and law-like
in its operation.30
Thus Murphy rejects occasionalism, that God is the sole actor (at the quantum level), as it
extends the problem of evil and removes any notion of independence for creation (in the
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sense that creation is ontologically distinct from God). Instead, every created entity has
intrinsic properties and potential actions which God respects.
Given that quantum entities have their own unique properties, there are four
possibilities for understanding the potential indeterminism of quantum events: they could
be completely undetermined (random), internally determined by the entity, determined by
the physical system the entity is in, or determined by God. 31 Under interpretations of
quantum mechanics that are ontologically indeterministic (such as the Copenhagen
interpretation), there are no sufficient natural causes for the outcome of a quantum event,
thus eliminating the second and third options. This leaves two possibilities: either the
events are underdetermined and random, or they are divinely chosen. Murphy proposes
that “God’s governance at the quantum level consists in activating or actualizing one or
another of the quantum entity’s innate powers at particular instants, and that these events
are not possible without God’s action.”32 God’s action is then only constrained by the
intrinsic nature of the entities he cooperates with; however, this constraint is voluntary on
the part of God. In this way, God respects “the integrity of the entities he has created.”33
In this account of quantum divine action, the regularities of the macroscopic level
are sustained by God’s continuous action at the quantum level. Since the behavior of
macroscopic objects is grounded in the statistical regularities of what happens at the
lowest level, God’s direct actions at the quantum level indirectly sustain the regularities
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of macro-sized objects while allowing for the possibility of extraordinary actions.34 The
statistical nature of quantum mechanical laws (given by the Born Rule) are thus
understood as “summaries of patterns in God’s action upon quantum entities and
processes.”35 According to Murphy, there is theological reason to suppose that God’s
quantum actions would be in such a fashion as to produce apparent uniformity at
macroscopic levels. Without such uniformity, there could not be an ordered, structured
cosmos capable of sustaining intelligent life that can make moral choices.36
In contrast to Murphy’s approach which holds that God is active in every quantum
event, Thomas Tracy offers an alternative to Murphy’s approach in which God acts in
particular quantum events, but not in every event.37 God could act with nature in order to
determine the outcome of every natural event, but in the majority of cases God refrains
from doing so. In Tracy’s view, while God acts universally in every event as the Creator
and Sustainer (ex nihilo) of the cosmos, God’s special action in determining the outcome
of an indeterministic event is not always present. Tracy points out that this possibility
raises conceptual and theological concerns. If chance events are “causally undetermined
only in their ‘horizontal’ relations to other finite events” but can be “fully determined by
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their ‘vertical’ relationships to God,”38 then why would a system develop in a way for
which it has no sufficient cause to do so? The outcome of such an indeterministic event
would be the result of chance, and could only be described by probabilistic laws. Tracy
explores the possibility that there are chance events which God does not determine:
In establishing the laws of nature, God determines how chance figures in the course
of events, and sets the range of outcomes that are possible. But if God chooses not to
determine these chance events, then at least some features of the world’s future will
be open, bounded but left unspecified in God’s creative intention. The structures of
nature will include within them a means for trying out novel possibilities not rigidly
prescribed by the past; God would, in effect, make a world that must in some respect
fill out the details of its own creation.39
This kind of ontological indeterminism has important theological implications. God’s
action in such an undetermined event is conceived as specifying the possible outcomes
for the system without determining which actual outcome will occur. This leads to a kind
of spontaneity to the natural world, one that could be theologically consonant with certain
understandings of providence.
Russell finds both Murphy’s and Tracy’s respective proposals useful for different
reasons. If God acts in all quantum events, then God not only sustains all natural events;
he also governs and cooperates with all natural occurrences. Thus Murphy’s position
“offers us a subtle but compelling way to interpret God’s action as leading to both
general and special providence.”40 Where Russell finds Tracy’s approach helpful is in
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providing an association between special providence and God’s particular action at the
quantum level; Tracy’s approach values the special character of God’s action. Russell
attempts to produce a synthesis between both approaches, combining the ubiquitous
quantum divine action in Murphy’s approach with Tracy’s emphasis on objective, special
events. It could be that God acts in a particular event as he does in all events, but
nevertheless the event can have special character in its revelatory function:
God will choose one state in particular and not the other… thus conveying God’s
intentionality in this particular event. We can thus interpret this particular event… in
terms of objective special providence without restricting God’s action to that event,
and yet still maintain the objectively revelatory character of that particular event.” 41
In order for Quantum NIODA to be a compelling account of special divine action, it
must be open for God to act in providentially efficacious ways without violating natural
laws.42 These ways may include responding to prayer, healing, or guiding evolutionary
history. Russell argues that these quantum events, although happening on a microscopic
scale, can lead to large changes at macroscopic scales. Classical measuring devices (such
as Geiger counters or a photoelectric counter) are examples that amplify quantum effects
into macrosystems. However, according to Russell there are natural occurrences that can
lead to the collapse of the wave function, such as the absorption or emission of a photon
by electrons in an atom and genetic mutations (which include point mutations, insertions,
errors in DNA replication, and radiative mutagens).43 Russell considers the quantum
effects in genetic mutations to open the door for a way to understand God’s interactions
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in evolutionary history without appealing to sporadic intervention (and thus breaks in the
chain of natural causes).44

Objections to Quantum NIODA
A common objection to non-interventionist approaches to divine action that appeal
to quantum mechanics is the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics. There are
multiple interpretations that are empirically equivalent but have radically different
metaphysical implications. The proposals of Russell, Murphy, and Tracy rely on the
Copenhagen family of interpretations, which include the indeterministic collapse of the
wave function. However, there are other interpretations that are deterministic and do not
feature wave function collapse. Examples include Bohmian mechanics and the ManyWorlds interpretation. If any of these interpretations turn out to be correct, then the
project of NIODA at the quantum level will be falsified. Furthermore, whichever
interpretation is adopted for NIODA will carry with it the philosophical issues that arise
from it.45 In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation, examples include the role of the
observer and the divide between classical and quantum scales. Nevertheless, the
Copenhagen interpretation has been the most common interpretation of quantum
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mechanics throughout the twentieth century and it is consistent with empirical
observations. Given the Copenhagen interpretation’s historic pedigree, I think it is a
reasonable approach as a potential candidate for NIODA.
Michael Dodds has raised an objection on how Russell and Murphy have employed
the Copenhagen interpretation to NIODA.46 Dodds argues that Russell and Murphy select
some aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation but accept others from its opponents:
They borrow from the Copenhagen interpretation the tenet that there are no natural
causes of quantum events while simultaneously ignoring its conviction that such
events require no causes. They then adopt the tenet of the opponents of the
Copenhagen interpretation that some causes are needed for quantum events while
ignoring their conviction that these causes must be natural and discoverable by
empirical science. Proponents of quantum divine action are then in a position to
affirm a divine cause for quantum events (since, as the opponents of the
Copenhagen interpretation maintain, some cause is needed), and to assert that this
divine cause cannot interfere with any natural causes (since, as the proponents of the
Copenhagen interpretation maintain, there simply are no natural causes at the
quantum level with which such a divine cause could possibly interfere).47
The possibility of Quantum NIODA is certainly beyond the standard Copenhagen
interpretation. However, I do not think this objection defeats their proposals. Adopting
the Copenhagen interpretation would entail accepting that quantum events can occur with
particular outcomes without sufficient natural causes, although that does not necessarily
exclude transcendent causes. Murphy’s attempt was to present a theory of causation and
divine action that is metaphysical in nature; its confirmation comes “from its consistency
with both science and theology, and especially from the fact that it solves problems that
have arisen at the interface between these two sorts of disciplines.”48 I think the best way

46

Michael J. Dodds, Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science & Thomas Aquinas
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 144–147.
47

Ibid., 145.

48

Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat,” 268.

45
to understand her proposal is not as following any one particular interpretation (despite
its similarities with the Copenhagen interpretation), but as its own metaphysical
interpretation of quantum events that requires divine action as a sufficient cause for every
natural event to occur. The proposal’s plausibility is determined by its theological,
metaphysical, and scientific consistency.49
An objection that Russell addresses is the tetralemma argument against Quantum
NIODA that was formulated by Wesley Wildman in his assessment of arguments made
by Nicholas Saunders against quantum special divine action (SDA).50 Wildman
summarizes the argument below:
To frame the tetralemma argument, let us assume (contrary to fact, for most DAP
participants) the most demanding criterion for an adequate theory of SDA, namely,
the following conjunction of four propositions: objectivity, incompatibilism,
noninterventionism, and strong-ontological view of laws of nature. Then the
argument concludes that all theories of SDA fail to meet this criterion. If this
argument against the possibility of SDA is valid—and no view of SDA that I am
aware of challenges the entailment—then we can protect SDA only by weakening or
rejecting one of the four propositions deﬁning the criterion for success. Of course,
no DAP participant accepts this four-fold criterion as the desirable goal for a theory
of SDA. The various moves within the DAP can still be analyzed along these lines,
and there is a payoff in insight for making the effort.51
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It is the fourth proposition, the strong-ontological view of the laws of nature, which
Saunders presses against Quantum NIODA. He argues that this approach is only viable if
one takes a descriptive approach to the laws of nature, as the probabilities given by the
Born Rule can only be an approximation for the outcomes of a large ensemble of events.
Saunders holds that for a quantum SDA proposal to be non-interventionist, then the
probabilities for the outcomes of the collapse of the wave function “must be held to be
ontologically derivative from the measurements themselves and thus not representative of
the ontology of a particular quantum system.” 52 However, he believes the proponents of
Quantum NIODA must hold to a strong ontological view of natural laws because in the
descriptive view laws are ontologically dependent on events; they do not govern the
events themselves. If that is the case, then not even deterministic theories are an obstacle
to special divine action because they ultimately do not prescribe what will happen; they
only describe what regularly happens and so there is no conflict with special divine
action.53 Saunders believes this reduces the value of Quantum NIODA:
The technical substance of this approach is to deny that Born’s probability
interpretation of the wavefunction has any ontological priority and assert that it is
simply an approximate relationship between ensembles of identical systems for a
given measurement repeated a large number of times. The next move is to interpret
quantum laws in a regularitarian methodology… The proposal is then that quantum
SDA occurs by means of God ‘ignoring’ or intervening against the measurement
probabilities ‘predicted’ by the orthodox theory.54
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In response, Russell points out that he does prefer the descriptive view of natural
laws. He writes that most scholars of theology and science see the laws as “describing
what is ultimately the regular and dependable action of God in nature.”55 Furthermore,
Russell does not think that the descriptive view undermines the importance of quantum
mechanics for divine action. Assuming that deterministic classical physics is true only in
a descriptive sense, if God were “to bring about something genuinely new and
unpredictable this would surely be a form of divine intervention, at least at the epistemic
level.”56 However, in quantum mechanics, if ontological indeterminism is part of the
norm, then God bringing about something new is not necessarily in violation of the
descriptions of natural law. When addressing the tetralemma, Russell certainly rejects the
fourth premise, but as it stands he finds the argument to be self-contradictory:
The tetralemma is intrinsically and self-evidently self-contradictory. An
incompatibilist account of non-interventionist objective divine action requires that
nature be causally indeterministic. But a strong-ontological interpretation of the
laws of nature means that nature is deterministically governed event by event by
these laws. Hence the flat-out contradiction at the center of Saunders’s argument. 57
The nature of a strong-ontological understanding of stochastic laws is also unclear; in
response to Saunders’s objection that quantum SDA is interventionist due to God
ignoring the probabilities in the outcome, Russell writes:
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But the deeper criticism Saunders advances is that if the laws of quantum mechanics
are thought to have an ontological status, then to act objectively God must ignore or
intervene in nature. But this would only be true if each event is determined by the
ontological probability distribution. It would not be true if the ensemble as a whole,
and not each event, is determined by the ontological probability distribution. Clearly
in the former view divine action by definition would be interventionist since it
would clash with the fact that the wave function determines each and every event. 58
On this view, the probabilities given by quantum mechanical laws govern not the
individual events themselves, but rather an ensemble of events as a whole. Thus, if God’s
action brings about the outcomes of measurement events within the probabilistic
constraints of quantum mechanics, then the stochastic laws are not violated. A similar
argument is found in Keith Ward’s work on divine action:
God may work within the probabilistic structure of physical laws to select a set of
paths which would not necessarily have eventuated by physical laws alone, though
the possibility of such a path exists in the natural world. Thus God could act within
the natural world, intentionally bringing about a particular future. If God exercised
this selectivity at all times, the laws of probability would change. So, if the laws of
probability are to remain the same, God cannot so choose as to make physically less
probable states happen continually, or even very often. From this it immediately
follows that, if God is to leave the structure of physical law intact, he cannot cause
the unlikely to happen very often (though he could do so sometimes).59
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In this way, divine action remains non-interventionist by respecting the overall stochastic
structure of the universe.
Timothy Sansbury has criticized Quantum NIODA as leading to a view of divine
action that is unable to act quickly enough to make substantial macroscopic changes or
leads to divine acts becoming confused and potentially self-contradictory. Sansbury, for
the sake of his argument, assumes that God is temporal and does not know the truth
values of future contingents.60 In this case, if divine action in response to a contingent
event (e.g. petitionary prayer) can only be initiated after the prompting event, then God’s
responsive action becomes significantly limited by quantum mechanics in two ways.
First, if the action at the quantum level is to have a macroscopic effect through some kind
of natural amplification (such as a chaotic system),61 then such effects would take time to
occur. If God is acting solely through Quantum NIODA, he may not be able to respond
appropriately to contingent events in order to achieve his goals.
Second, if divine action takes place within the indeterminism of quantum events that
are amplified chaotically, then
The very indeterminacy that makes divine action possible also makes it possible that
it could be naturally thwarted or become unnecessary. The amplifier depends upon a
relatively precise sequence of events occurring in succession. It seems unlikely that
the usual state of affairs is such that supersensitive systems exist commonly enough
to amplify divine actions but that no other such systems will be present that can
60
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misdirect the first. On a purely physical level, this concern may be mitigated by the
claim that divine control extends to all quantum events. However, unless all human
activity is made determinate or divinely controlled, amplifying systems should be
sensitive to human actions, which could cause unforeseeable consequences,
potentially interfering with a divinely inspired sequence in the same manner. The
processes that could translate quantum determinations into specific macroscopic
events must be extremely delicate to respond to a limited set of quantum events, and
therefore even slight interference should be expected to disrupt or even destroy the
process before it reaches its intended conclusion.62
Sansbury notes that the problems raised by responsive action could be relaxed by God
taking action before the initiating event takes place. But if this is the case, then God must
act on the basis of guesses of the future (as he is presuming that God does not have
knowledge of future contingents). Even if the future guess is the most likely course of
events, there will still be times in which the guess is wrong. When that is the case, God
would have to respond to his own previous action by countering its effects, which may
not be possible through quantum effects depending on the progress of its amplification.
“The web of divine actions and reactions would quickly become confused, and, even if
there were no interventions into the natural order, such a divine repairman is far more
theologically abhorrent than an intervening deity.”63
I am not aware of anywhere Russell has directly responded to Sansbury’s article.
However, Russell does address some of the issues raised by Sansbury. In regards to

62

Sansbury, “The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics,” 117.

Ibid., 118. Sansbury summarizes his critique: “In summary, quantum mechanics leaves the question
of divine action in an almost unchanged tension between activity from the past and an absurd cycle of
actions and reactions. While quantum mechanics does allow the tinkering divine repairman to act behind
the veil of quantum indeterminacy and therefore within natural law, the interventionism problem is
exchanged for the probability that divine actions often will fail to produce their desired effect, sometimes
improperly anticipate future states, and quite possibly entirely fail to emerge at the macroscopic level
because of intervening environmental influences. It is problematic to envision any way that quantum
mechanics could provide a robust account of divine action without entailing divine foreknowledge of future
contingencies.” Ibid., 118.
63

51
God’s knowledge of future contingents, Russell does affirm that God has knowledge of
indeterminate quantum events: “In essence, God can know which potential state will
become actual since God causes it to become actual!”64 Russell only briefly addresses the
issues regarding libertarian free will and quantum indeterminism. He notes that the
proposal of God’s activity in all quantum events does raise issues for quantum events
occurring in a person’s body; if God determines the outcome of all such events this leads
to what Russell calls “somatic overdetermination.” He suggests that God acts in all
quantum events except those of consciousness, so that God chooses to refrain from
determining the outcomes of decisions made by conscious agents. This divine selflimitation is in order to allow for the top-down influence of the agent’s mind to freely
make decisions.65 If God does not control the decisions of free agents, then Sansbury’s
critique may be viable if future contingent free will decisions are indeterminate (and
therefore not knowable in a determinate way).

Concluding Remarks
Despite the methodological and theoretical difficulties, I find the Quantum NIODA
proposals of Russell, Murphy, and Tracy to be plausible when understood within the
respective qualifications each author provides. For example, Russell does not intend his
proposal to be a comprehensive account of divine action; it does not account for creation
ex nihilo, the resurrection, or the eschatological renewal of creation (as the last two
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involve the transformation of the matter present). Furthermore, they do not present
Quantum NIODA as necessarily contradictory to other proposals of divine action; in fact
Russell stresses the need for other approaches. Even if Quantum NIODA is not a
comprehensive account, it does not mean that it is unimportant as it could serve a role in
forming a theology of nature.
In pursuing an account of Quantum NIODA, there are a number of issues which
require detailed responses. The first issue is how stochastic laws of nature are to be
interpreted. This is a potential flaw in Quantum NIODA because if God’s action in
quantum events ignores the outcomes predicted by the theory itself, then there seems to
be a degree of interventionism involved. The nature of the stochastic laws in quantum
mechanics (particularly the Born Rule) must be addressed in any consistent Quantum
NIODA proposal. Second, the scope of possible macroscopic effects due to quantum
events must also be considered. There does not seem to be a consensus on the degree that
quantum level effects can affect macro-sized objects; this is part of a larger issue of how
quantum physics is related to classical physics. This is particularly true for applying
chaos theory with quantum mechanics.
A third issue is the interpretation of quantum mechanics. While the Copenhagen
interpretation has been one of the most common interpretations throughout the history of
quantum mechanics, it is not the only one. Russell’s strategy of adopting it as a necessary
part of exploring the possibilities for Quantum NIODA is a wise choice due to its
historical pedigree. However, I think additional steps should be taken to assess the
different interpretations of quantum mechanics on scientific, metaphysical, and
theoretical grounds. Quantum NIODA would be strengthened if there are reasons to
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reject deterministic interpretations (or weakened if there are reasons to reject
indeterministic ones). Furthermore, there are other indeterministic interpretations of
quantum mechanics that may allow for Quantum NIODA proposals which offer possible
advantages compared to the models based on the Copenhagen interpretation. Any
Quantum NIODA proposal must employ an interpretation in order to be specific,
although it may make metaphysical and theological modifications to the interpretation
itself. However, when the specific proposal does adopt an interpretation it takes on the
potential strengths and weaknesses associated with that interpretation, and it is important
to remain consistent in employing the interpretation. Since no interpretation of quantum
mechanics is forced by the scientific evidence, there is an underdetermination in choosing
an interpretation to work with. This does not mean that the choice becomes an arbitrary
one; it can be informed by criteria including contrivance, critical application of Occam’s
razor, simplicity, and potential fruitfulness.
Fourth, a Quantum NIODA proposal must be situated within an underlying theology
of God’s providence, temporality, omniscience, and theodicy. Sansbury’s critique of
Quantum NIODA clarifies the importance of specificity on these issues. A model in
which God determines the outcome of every event may raise issues for theodicy. God’s
potential response to future contingent events is different if there is no objective
becoming in time (i.e. the block universe view) than if God acts within a world of
temporal becoming. These issues are interrelated and may theologically constrain models
of Quantum NIODA. It is important to be explicit and consistent in the underlying
theology employed for these issues.

Chapter Four
Alvin Plantinga on Science and Divine Action

Alvin Plantinga is one of the most influential philosophers of the past century. He is
well known for his contributions to the free will defense of the problem of evil and
religious epistemology. He has also written on the relation of science and theistic belief
in Where the Conflict Really Lies,1 arguing that there is only superficial conflict but deep
concord between science and Christian belief and superficial concord but deep conflict
between science and naturalism. In Where the Conflict Really Lies he considers topics
including the compatibility of evolution (and evolutionary psychology) with Christian
belief, fine-tuning, and the philosophical roots of science. He also develops his
evolutionary argument against naturalism, arguing that the conjunction of naturalism and
evolution epistemologically undercuts itself. For his work in science and religion, he was
awarded the Templeton Prize in 2017. In this chapter, I will consider his work on the
compatibility of science and divine action.2

Classical Physics and Divine Action
In Plantinga’s consideration of divine action and science, he first considers the
objections to special divine action from the perspective of classical physics. In order to
understand the perceived incompatibility between classical physics and special divine
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action, he considers the positions of theologians such as Langdon Gilkey, Rudolph
Bultmann, and John Macquerrie. These three do not object to God creating and
preserving the world. Instead, their difficulty “is with the claim that God does or has done
anything in addition to creating the world and sustaining it in existence; creation and
preservation, they think (or fear, or suspect) exhaust the divine activity.” 3 This objection
specifically targets miracles and divine intervention; any special divine action (beyond
creation and conservation) must intervene in the natural order God has created and
upholds. God is then seen as a deity who allows the universe to evolve according to the
laws he has established as a kind of hands-off theology.4 In summary:
The problem, then, as these people see it, is this. Science discovers and endorses
natural laws; if God did miracles or acted specially in the world, he would have to
contravene these laws and miraculously intervene; and that is incompatible with
science. Religion and science, therefore, are in conflict, which does not bode well
for religion.5
This objection is rooted in classical physics, which includes Newton’s laws of
motion and Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetism. However, classical physics can
be interpreted in different ways, two of which Plantinga calls the Newtonian picture and
the Laplacean picture. Each picture creates a different worldview, and when applying
these respective worldviews to special divine action different results are possible. In the
Newtonian picture, the universe is understood “as a vast machine evolving or operating
according to fixed laws: the laws of classical physics.”6 This creates a mechanical view
of the universe, but, according to Plantinga, it does not entail the impossibility of special
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divine action. Newton himself believed that God acted regularly to adjust the orbits of the
planets to keep them stable.
The Newtonian picture thus contains a caveat for the natural laws that govern the
universe.7 The natural laws themselves may be deterministic, but in the Newtonian
picture they only “describe how the world works when, or provided that the world is a
closed (isolated) system, subject to no outside causal influence. In classical physics, the
great conservation laws deduced from Newton’s laws are stated for closed or isolated
systems.”8 With the caveat that the natural laws only apply when there are no external
causal influences on the system, the objection that classical physics precludes any
possibility of special divine action is not justified. If God exists and interacts with the
universe, then the universe is not a closed system. It is only within a metaphysical view in
which the material universe is causally closed that classical physics can be seen as
forbidding any kind of external divine influence. Thus the natural laws of classical
physics do not forbid special divine action, nor are they undercut by the possibility of
divine action. In fact, “on this conception it isn’t even possible that God break a law of
nature.”9
The second picture consistent with classical physics is what Plantinga calls the
Laplacean picture.10 The Laplacean picture differs from the Newtonian picture in that it
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keeps the deterministic laws of classical physics while also accepting the causal closure
of the universe. Given the initial conditions of the universe and the deterministic laws
that govern them, the future follows with certainty and the past can be perfectly
calculated from the present. According to Plantinga, it is this picture (not classical
physics) that does not allow for special divine action. The Laplacean picture can only be
true if God does not act in ways beyond creation or preservation; thus the theist who
defends special divine action is not compelled to accept the causal closure of the
universe. The rejection of the Laplacean picture is not a rejection of classical physics, but
the rejection of a metaphysical worldview. In fact, if the universe is causally closed, one
does not need the laws of classical physics to know that special divine action is
impossible! However, since classical physics does not entail the Laplacean picture,
classical physics is not incompatible with special divine action.

Quantum Physics and Divine Action
Plantinga has so far argued that classical physics is not a defeater for special divine
action. Instead, it is the causal closure of the Laplacean picture that is incompatible with
special divine action. However, he notes that classical physics has been superseded by
new physical theories, particularly quantum mechanics. He evaluates what quantum
mechanics contributes to the understanding of divine action and concludes that it offers
even less of a problem than classical physics due to the indeterministic outcomes of the
collapse of the wave function. Furthermore, Plantinga suggests a model for divine action
based in the objective collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics, particularly the
theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (or GRW theory).
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There is a family of interpretations called objective collapse theories (or
spontaneous collapse theories) which attempt to resolve many of the issues related to the
measurement problem in standard quantum mechanics (i.e. the Copenhagen
interpretation) by introducing stochastic and nonlinear terms into the fundamental
dynamical equations of quantum theory.11 In the GRW collapse theory, the wave function
of a particle is localized (collapses) mathematically by multiplying the wave function by
a Gaussian equation (this type of equation has the shape of a bell curve; this occurrence is
referred to as a GRW hit). The location of the wave function collapse is intrinsically
random, but the probability can be given by the square amplitude of the wave function at
the region prior to collapse (corresponding to the Born Rule). However, this localization
process does not perfectly locate the wave function at a precise point. The width of the
Gaussian equation is chosen in order to make the predictions of the theory match
observations; this constitutes a new fundamental physical constant. Furthermore, since
wave function collapse takes place randomly over time, another physical constant must
be introduced in order to predict the average time it takes an isolated particle to collapse.
The GRW theory chooses the values of 10-5 cm and 1015 seconds, or about 100 million
years, for these constants.12 GRW thus modifies quantum mechanics to make wave
function collapse a fundamental part of the theory; a collapse can occur without a
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measurement. The time in which a collapse occurs and the result of the collapse are
fundamentally stochastic.
Objective collapse theories like GRW offer potential advantages for how God may
act at the quantum level when compared to proposals based on the Copenhagen
interpretation. Since indeterminism is only located in the outcomes of measurement
events in the Copenhagen interpretation, non-interventionist special divine action would
occur episodically rather than continuously.13 In contrast, GRW theory introduces
additional indeterministic elements: the collapses occur at random times, the outcome
that occurs is random, and even though the final wave function peaks at the location of
the GRW hit, the wave function is still nonzero over the whole of space (the particle is
never fully localized).14 Furthermore, GRW does not need an extra postulate to account
for wave function collapse upon measurement, as the Copenhagen interpretation requires,
because wave function collapse is included in the dynamical equations of the theory.
Plantinga’s model for divine action follows a similar line of reasoning as the
previous proposals made by Russell, Murphy, and Tracy. He interprets the indeterminism
of GRW as implying that there are no sufficient natural causes for the outcome of the
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collapse (or the time in which the collapse occurs), thus allowing the possibility of
nonphysical causes to influence the system:
On this approach we could think of the nature of a system as dictating that collapses
occur at the regular rate they in fact display. What is presently of significance,
however, is that on these approaches there is no cause for a given collapse to go to
the particular value (the particular position, for example) or eigenstate to which in
fact it goes. That is, there is no physical cause; there is nothing in the previous
physical state of the world that causes a given collapse to go to the particular
eigenstate to which it does go. But of course this state of affairs might very well
have a nonphysical cause. It’s wholly in accord with these theories that, for any
collapse and the resulting eigenstate, it is God who causes that state to result.
Perhaps, then, all collapse-outcomes (as we might call them) are caused by God. If
so, then between collapses, a system evolves according to the Schrödinger equation;
but when a collapse occurs, it is divine agency that causes the specific collapseoutcome that ensues. On this view of God’s special action – call it “divine collapsecausation” (“DCC”) – God is always acting specially, that is, always acting in ways
that go beyond creation and conservation, thus obviating the problem alleged to lie
in his sometimes treating the world in hands-off fashion but other times in a handson way.15
Since it is within the nature of the system to collapse to particular outcomes
stochastically, this kind of divine action does not require a violation of the nature of the
system. God is always involved in special action, and therefore unique actions are not
unexpected.16 Plantinga concludes that the objection against special divine action from
science is not convincing: “there is nothing in current or classical science inconsistent
with special divine action in the world.”17
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There are a number of implications from appealing to GRW theory for special
divine action, which Bradley Monton explores.18 Monton argues that given the
indeterminism present in GRW theory, there are not any significant restrictions on what
God could potentially do without violating the laws of GRW theory. Since the wave
function is nonzero throughout all space at all times and the time between GRW hits is
random, God has potentially unlimited freedom on when and where any particular
particle is localized:
Now we come to the crucial argumentative move of my paper. Within the
constraints of the laws of the GRW theory, God can make a GRW hit happen
anywhere, on any particle, or collection of particles. This gives God the power to
move particles around anywhere in the universe. And moreover, God can do so
arbitrarily quickly, just by making the GRW hits happen in an arbitrarily small
amount of time.19
Monton concludes by exploring a theological implication of the possibility that God
could act in this way. On this picture God must be ready to act in the world to ensure that
the world does not go horribly wrong. With so much indeterminism allowed (however
improbable), God would need to ensure that certain events, such as the random scattering
of all the particles that make up the earth throughout the universe, do not happen.20

Defining Interventionism
Throughout his discussion of divine action, Plantinga attempts to carefully define
intervention. He concludes that while an intervention can be defined in the classical

Bradley Monton, “God Acts in the Quantum World,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
Volume 5, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 167-184.
18

19

20

Ibid., 172.

Ibid., 181–182. Although the likelihood of such an occurrence happening by chance is
unfathomably small.

62
picture, it is unclear whether intervention can be defined in the quantum mechanical
picture. I will adopt much of his notation (with slight modifications for the sake of
consistency and clarity) and summarize his attempt to define intervention. Take S(t) and
S(t*) to describe the states of the universe (or some system) at times t and t* where t* is a
time later than t. Then natural laws can be defined as: “(LN) When the universe is
causally closed (when God is not acting specially in the world), P.”21 Since the natural
laws in the classical picture are deterministic, the conjunction of S(t) and LN implies that
the state of the universe at a later time t*, S(t*), follows with certainty as S(t*) is the only
outcome allowed by the conjunction of S(t) and (LN) assuming the causal closure of the
universe.
If S(t) & (LN) entails one possible future state of the universe, S(t*), then an
intervention could be defined as having occurred between t and t* if S(t*) is not true at t*
if S(t) & (LN) was true at time t. Now, if we suppose E to be an event that is the result of
an intervention at time t*, then S(t) & (LN) does not entail that E occurs at t*. Thus, an
intervention (INT) could be defined as an act A which causes an event E to occur at t*
where, for an interval of times t bounded above by t*, S(t) & (LN) does not entail that E
occurs at t* for all t in the time interval.22 While this definition of an intervention works
well for classical physics, Plantinga points out that it does not work in the context of
quantum mechanics due to its potential indeterminism. In order to extend the concept of
intervention to include indeterministic theories other definitions must be explored.
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One possibility is that “God intervenes if and only if he performs an action A,
thereby causing a state of affairs that would not have occurred if God had not performed
A.”23 However, Plantinga finds this definition to be problematic because of God’s action
in conserving existence. Conserving the created order is not considered to be an
intervention, but such action leads to a different state of affairs than if he had not acted to
conserve existence. Plantinga explores a second possibility: “God intervenes if and only
if he performs an action A thereby causing an event E that (a) goes beyond conservation
and creation, and (b) is such that if he had not performed A, E would not have
occurred.”24 Plantinga still does not find this to be a satisfactory definition because it
makes no distinction between interventionist and non-interventionist special divine
action. Under this definition, any special divine action must be considered interventionist.
In order to obtain a working definition of intervention, Plantinga turns to the definition
provided by Wesley Wildman on the DAP:
Most participants certainly felt that God would not create an orderly world in which
it was impossible for the creator to act without violating the created structures of
order… A noninterventionist special divine act is in accord with created structures
of order and regularity within nature, while an interventionist special divine act
involves abrogating, suspending, or ignoring created structures of order and
regularity within nature.25
Apart from analyzing the concept of an intervention in order to give it a precise
definition, Plantinga considers three theological objections often raised against the
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possibility of intervention. The first objection concerns the issues interventionism raises
for theodicy. Plantinga cites George Ellis as a representative of this objection:
The problem of allowing miraculous intervention, to turn water into wine, to heal
the sick, to raise the dead… is that this involves either a suspension or alteration of
the natural order. Thus the question arises as to why this happens so seldom. If this
is allowed at all to achieve some good, why is it not allowed all the time, to assuage
my toothache as well as the evils of Auschwitz?... What one would like here – if one
is to make sense of the idea of miracles – is some kind of rock-solid criterion of
choice underlying such decisions to act in a miraculous manner, for if there is the
necessity to hold to these laws during times of the persecutions and Hitler’s Final
Solution, during famines and floods, in order that morality be possible, then how can
it be that sometimes this iron necessity can fade away and allow turning water to
wine or the raising of Lazarus?26
If special divine action in the form of interventions is possible, then that raises the
question of why God does not intervene more often to stop various kinds of evils. Many
of the miracles recorded in Scripture can seem arbitrary when compared to Auschwitz;
why would God turn water into wine for a wedding but not stop industrialized mass
murder? Against this objection, Plantinga argues that there is no reason to suppose that
we, as finite human beings, would be in a position to know why God would act one way
in a specific circumstance but act differently in another. “His options and possibilities are
far beyond our ken; his ways are ‘past finding out’; we can hardly expect to come up with
a ‘rock-solid criterion’ underlying God’s decisions to act.”27
The second objection is that interventionism undermines the regularity required for
the responsible exercise of free will. Plantinga again cites George Ellis on this objection:
Nevertheless it seems probable that fixed laws of behavior of matter, independent of
interference by a Creator or any other agency, is a requisite basis of existence of
26
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independent beings able to exercise free will, for they make possible meaningful
complex organized activity without outside interference (physical laws providing a
determinate frame within which definite local causal relations are possible).28
This objection argues that if intervention were a regular feature of the world, then reliable
agency would no longer be possible. Plantinga does not find this a compelling reason to
reject intervention because intelligent, intentional actions could still be made even if
divine intervention always introduced irregularity: “What’s required for free action is that
there be enough regularity for us to know or sensibly conjecture – at least for the most
part and with reasonably high probability – what will happen if we freely choose to take a
given action.”29 If God has intervened in the world on particular occasions, that does not
mean he will act in the same manner at all places and times. Responsible action towards
intended goals is not threatened by the possibility of intervention.
The third objection Plantinga considers is what he calls “the divine consistency
objection.”30 If God creates and maintains the regularities of natural processes then there
appears to be a kind of internal conflict if God must simultaneously ignore or violate
these same natural processes in order to act in the world.31 However, Plantinga does not
think special divine action necessarily contradicts natural laws given his caveat that they
only apply to closed systems; this objection implicitly falls back on the Laplacean
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picture. Furthermore, God may have good reasons for having predictable natural
processes but also for acting in unique ways when there are special circumstances. There
is nothing that prevents God from acting in two distinct ways with creation. Plantinga
suggests that God may be like a classical artist who prizes economy and discipline, but he
may also be a romantic artist who prefers creativity and abundance.32 If God can express
himself in a variety of ways, then there does not seem to be any outright contradiction
between God acting in two seemingly conflicting manners.

Concluding Remarks
I find Plantinga’s caveat that natural laws only apply to closed systems to be useful
but I think a number of qualifications must be made. Hans Halvorson has noted that
placing provisos on the range in which a natural law can be applied is viable and not
uncommon in the philosophy of science, but it is questionable whether the way Plantinga
uses the caveat that Newtonian physics only applies to closed systems is legitimate. The
caveat that a natural law only applies to a closed system is generally taken to mean that
the system is a subsystem of a larger physical system that can influence it. 33 As I
understand Plantinga, he intends the caveat to mean that natural laws apply only when the
universe is causally closed; that is, when the universe is metaphysically closed. At most,
an appeal to this kind of caveat alone can only defend the bare compatibility of natural
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laws and special divine action in that they are not logically contradictory. 34 Despite the
caveat’s limitations, there is an extent to which any kind of non-interventionist proposal
will have to incorporate a similar principle if divine action is to be objective.
I found Plantinga’s discussion on interventionism to be helpful. However, his
definition of intervention could be extended in an attempt to include indeterministic
natural laws. This may be useful for assessing the possibility of non-interventionist
special divine action. I will also explore a qualitative definition of interventionism; if
non-interventionist special divine action cannot be differentiated from interventionist
action then this project will not be insightful. Out of the objections Plantinga considers
against interventionism, I believe the strongest to be divine consistency because the
issues related to the problem of evil apply equally to any non-interventionist proposal
with a non-trivial degree of indeterminism. I think there is a degree of internal conflict,
rather than logical contradiction,35 between the notions that God maintains natural
processes that behave in predictable ways while frequently acting separately from those
processes. The potential for non-interventionist special divine action is that God could
work within some relevant natural process to affect change without violating the causal
order of creation to do so, thus avoiding the divine consistency objection outright.
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existence. This may be appealing for those concerned about associating God too closely with natural causes
(for fear that any such proposal would reduce God to a natural cause), but this comes at the cost of losing
the possibility of finding a degree of consonance with natural processes (which can be explored
scientifically) and special divine action.
34

Plantinga’s response against the divine consistency objection seems satisfactory to show there is no
logical contradiction between the two concepts.
35
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Plantinga’s appeal to collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics other than the
Copenhagen interpretation illustrates two more points. First, the success of a quantum
non-interventionist divine action proposal is not bound to any one particular
interpretation because there are multiple indeterministic interpretations. Second, the
theoretical structure of GRW theory would seem to allow practically limitless freedom
for non-interventionist divine action. This is an exciting possibility, but just as
Plantinga’s DCC proposal exploits the particular characteristics of GRW theory it also
must take on its weaknesses. For any such proposal to be compelling, the interpretation of
quantum mechanics it is based upon should be plausible or even preferred.
Objective collapse theories, like the GRW theory and its subsequent modifications,
can be made consistent with current observations. However, they do so by modifying the
dynamical equations of quantum mechanics and choosing values for new physical
constants: the frequency of collapse for an isolated particle and the width of the Gaussian
function. In making the collapse of the wave function an explicit part of the dynamical
equations of quantum theory, it seems to add a degree of complexity that is unnecessary
for empirical predictions. With the new physical constants introduced to make the theory
consistent with observations and the introduction of a stochastic mechanism to collapse
the wave function at random times, the theory also has a degree of contrivance when
compared to the Copenhagen interpretation. Furthermore, the distribution of the wave
function over all of space after a GRW hit, which is deliberately exploited in Plantinga’s
DCC proposal, has been considered by many to be a potential theoretical issue rather than
an accurate description of reality (this issue requires a reinterpretation of the nature of the
wave function). However, further experiments could be conducted in order to test the
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theory in comparison with standard quantum theory since it makes modifications to
quantum theory. If it is confirmed by future experiments or offers a more compelling
metaphysical picture than other interpretations, then it would become a preferable
interpretation. Currently, I believe GRW theory and its variants are too contrived and add
unnecessary complexity without sufficient empirical justification to be a compelling
interpretation of quantum mechanics.36
In conclusion, Plantinga’s DCC proposal appears to be a plausible as a noninterventionist proposal, but it is based on an interpretation of quantum mechanics that is
not theoretically compelling. This does not undermine Plantinga’s work evaluating
interventionism and placing a caveat on natural laws to include the possibility that the
universe is not causally closed to external, transcendent causes. Plantinga is also quick to
point out that the warrant for special divine action is not found in science; it has its own
independent sources of warrant:
What we should think of special divine action, therefore, doesn’t depend on QM or
versions thereof, or on current science more generally. Indeed, what we should think
of current science can quite properly depend, in part, on theology… The sensible
religious believer is not obliged to trim her sails to the current scientific breeze on
this topic, revising her belief on the topic every time science changes its mind… But
where Christian or theistic belief and current science can fit nicely together, as with
DCC, so much the better; and if one of the current versions of QM fits better with
such belief than the others, that’s a perfectly proper reason to accept that version.
True, this version may not win out in the long run… so the acceptance in question
(as of QM itself) must be provisional. Who knows what the future will bring? But
we can say at least the following: at this point, given this evidence, this is how
things look. And that’s as much as can be said for any scientific theory.37

36

A critique of special divine action based on collapse theories like GRW can be found in Nicholas
Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156–159.
37

Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 121.
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Plantinga’s remarks are a good reminder that the essential nature of any noninterventionist proposal for special divine action is always provisional and revisable as
we obtain a tighter grasp on reality.

Chapter Five
Developing a Non-Interventionist Approach to Special Divine Action- Part One:
Preliminary Concerns

In this chapter I will explore three foundational issues before attempting to construct
a non-interventionist account of special divine action in the next chapter. The first is on
defining interventionism, in which I conclude that even though it is not clear what a
precise definition of intervention is for indeterministic natural laws, there is a proposition
which brings out a major difficulty with non-interventionist proposals. In addressing this
concern, I will reexamine the interpretation of probabilistic laws as describing the
behavior of an ensemble of events and Plantinga’s caveat that natural laws describe what
will occur in closed systems. The second set of issues are related to divine providence
and the nature of time, particularly on whether temporal becoming is objective and the
extent to which God acts in indeterministic events. The third is an overview of various
interpretations of quantum theory, in which I conclude that the consistent histories
interpretation is most plausible.

Defining Intervention
In Plantinga’s work on divine action he offered a precise definition of what would
constitute an intervention in classical physics and concluded that the concept of
intervention is problematic in quantum mechanics. For classical physics, he used the
following definition: an intervention (INT) can be defined as an act A which causes an
event E to occur at t* where, for an interval of times t bounded above by t*, S(t) & (LN)
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does not entail that E occurs at t* for all t in the time interval.1 This definition works well
for deterministic laws, but it comes into difficulties with indeterministic laws. In an
attempt to give a definition for intervention for indeterministic laws, Plantinga proposes
that “God intervenes if and only if he performs an action A thereby causing an event E
that (a) goes beyond conservation and creation, and (b) is such that if he had not
performed A, E would not have occurred.”2 However, he points out that this will not do
because it does not distinguish between interventionist action and non-interventionist
action. He then appeals to the definition offered by Wesley Wildman: “A
noninterventionist special divine act is in accord with created structures of order and
regularity within nature, while an interventionist special divine act involves abrogating,
suspending, or ignoring created structures of order and regularity within nature.” 3
The qualitative definition offered by Wildman is likely the best way to define
interventionism. However, Plantinga’s attempt to define intervention in a precise way can
be useful, as it can draw out potential difficulties for non-interventionist divine action. I
propose to extend the definition in the following way: suppose there is an interval of
times t bounded above by t*, where S(t) and S(t*) denotes the state of some system at t
and t* respectively, (LN) denotes natural laws, and S(t) & (LN) entail a set of possible
outcomes for a later time t*, {Sa(t*)}, where a denotes each different outcome (for n
different outcomes allowed, a = 1, 2, 3, … n). An action A is an intervention (INT) if A

1

Where S(t) denotes the state of the system (or universe) at time t and (LN) denotes natural laws. If
natural laws are deterministic, then the state of the system at a future time t*, denoted by S(t*), is entailed
by the conjunction of S(t) and (LN).
2
Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 112.

Wesley Wildman, “The Divine Action Project, 1988–2003,” Theology and Science 2, no. 1 (April
2004): 38.
3
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causes the future state S(t*) such that S(t*) is not a member of {Sa(t*)}. This definition
captures the possibility of natural laws allowing for different outcomes, as in an
ontologically indeterministic system, but also covers the possibility of deterministic
systems (in which case the set {Sa(t*)} has only one possibility, n = 1). But there is a
problem: it is still conceivable that an intervention (INT) could occur even if S(t*) is a
member of {Sa(t*)} because natural causality could be violated but still end up with a
result that could have occurred naturally. We can modify the statement so that an action
that results in a future state, S(t*), that is not allowed by natural laws (it is not a member
of {Sa(t*)}) is definitely an intervention: if an action A causes the future state S(t*) of the
system at time t* such that S(t*) is not a member of {Sa(t*)}, then action A is an
intervention (INT).
This proposition works well for denoting actions that are definite interventions, even
with indeterministic laws. However, indeterministic laws, like those in quantum
mechanics under the Copenhagen interpretation, not only specify the possible outcomes
but also the probabilities for each possible outcome. This can be denoted as S(t) & (LN)
entail {Sa(t*), pa} where pa gives the probability of some outcome Sa(t*) occurring. Now
the earlier proposition for when an action is a definite intervention can be modified: if an
action A causes the future state S(t*) of the system at time t* such that S(t*) is not a
member of {Sa(t*)} or S(t*) does not occur in accordance with the probability pa (where
{Sa(t*), pa} is entailed by S(t) & (LN) at an earlier time t), then action A is an
intervention (INT). Even though a precise, direct definition of intervention is
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problematic,4 this proposition captures a potential issue for non-interventionist
approaches to special divine action.
Suppose that God can act in a non-interventionist way by cooperating with
indeterministic natural causes to bring about the outcome. If God does act in this way
then the outcome, for the individual event, effectively occurs with a probability of one.
However, if the probabilities specified by the indeterministic laws are between zero and
one (if there are different possible outcomes), then this kind of action seems to constitute
an intervention. This is because even if the outcome God acted to bring about was
allowed by the laws, the outcome did not occur in accordance with the probabilities
specified by the laws. The implication is that this kind of divine action would still qualify
as an intervention of sorts. I believe this is the greatest technical difficulty with noninterventionist proposals for special divine action.
There are approaches that could resolve this issue, or at least provide a few steps in
the right direction. Russell addressed this issue by arguing that the ontological probability
distributions describe not individual events but rather an ensemble of events as a whole.5
Ward also made a similar argument: God created the universe with its stochastic structure
and processes, and non-interventionist divine action will respect these probabilistic
patterns.6 The probabilistic laws describe the structure of the universe as a whole, not the
outcome of individual events. This allows for many different future possibilities to
become actualized in a way that respects the patterns of probability, as the probabilistic

4
I find Wildman’s definition satisfactory for capturing the central aim of non-interventionist action;
God can act in his creation in special, particular ways without somehow suspending natural processes.
5

Russell, Cosmology, 176.

6

Ward, Divine Action, 119-127.
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laws do not prescribe the probabilities for individual outcomes but rather the stochastic
patterns of the whole universe. God’s action will not violate the probabilistic laws if the
state of the universe conforms to the probabilistic-pattern described by those laws.7 Thus,
this approach attempts to solve the probability laws issue by holding that they provide
patterns that apply to the universe as a whole or to sufficiently large ensembles of events.
This approach assumes that God can cooperate with nature to produce the outcome
of an otherwise indeterministic event (e.g. the collapse of the wave function) as long as a
large ensemble of such events follow the probability patterns described by natural laws.
However, this still seems to be in tension with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics, in which the probabilities for the outcome of each measurement event is
found using the Born Rule (as it calculates the probabilities directly from the wave
function describing the system or particle). This presents an issue for this kind of
approach, as it appears that the probability laws apply directly to individual measurement
events and not only to patterns of the universe as a whole (that is, the pattern of the
universe as a whole seems to be determined by the probabilities of the individual events
themselves, not the other way around). However, if the wave function is seen only as
weakly objective8 and the probabilities for each measurement as a description, rather than

7

It is important to note that God is the creator and sustainer of this probabilistic structure; it is not a
metaphysical restraint on God.
8

This objection assumes that the wave function is in some way objective. However, William Stoeger
notes that “Of course it is vital to stress that the wave function is not an objective reality. But, from a
philosophical point of view, it certainly ‘stands for’ or represents some hidden underlying ‘objective’
reality. Since it gives the probabilities for outcomes of potential experiments on some system, it must in
some way represent the system, however partially, indirectly, or inadequately.” William R. Stoeger,
“Epistemological and Ontological Issues Arising from Quantum Theory,” in Quantum Mechanics:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, Philip Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly,
and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 2001), 94.
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a prescription, of the likelihood of each outcome then this objection is not fatal.9 Another
promising direction is to make a distinction for probabilistic laws as an approximation to
what might occur under particular circumstances and the possibilities that the system
might develop into. The predicted probabilities are, by nature, only statistically true; they
can only give an approximation for which outcome will actually occur.
Another strategy is to employ the caveat that William Alston and Alvin Plantinga
applied to natural laws: they “describe how the world works when, or provided that the
world is a closed (isolated) system, subject to no outside causal influence.”10 The caveat
that laws only describe a system when it is not subject to outside causal influences is a
plausible one. In a theistic picture, the universe is not causally closed from God. If God
acts in special providential ways, then this will make an objective, causally efficacious
difference in the world. This openness of creation to transcendent causal influences
means a theistic view of natural laws that allows for special divine action (noninterventionist or interventionist) must include some form of this caveat. A natural place
to apply it in the Copenhagen interpretation is the Born Rule. In this approach, the Born
Rule can be used to calculate the probabilities of each outcome given that the system is
not subject to transcendent causal influences.11

9
This understanding of the quantum mechanical laws is a regularitarian interpretation rather than a
strong ontological interpretation. Nicholas Saunders critiques this approach to quantum special divine
action because it denies “that Born’s probability interpretation of the wave function has any ontological
priority and assert that it is simply an approximate relationship between ensembles of identical systems for
a given measurement repeated a large number of times… The proposal is then that quantum SDA occurs by
means of God’s ‘ignoring’ or intervening against the measurement probabilities ‘predicted’ by the orthodox
theory.” Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 155.
10
Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 78. Also see William P. Alston, “Divine Action, Human
Freedom, and the Laws of Nature,” in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives
on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C. J. Isham (Vatican City: Vatican
Observatory Publications, 1993), 187–191.
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In summary, the issue of probabilistic laws is a difficult problem for any noninterventionist proposal. However, there are other ways to interpret the probabilistic laws
and patterns that may be able to address the issue. First, I think it is wise to include that
non-interventionist action would respect the large-scale probabilistic patterns and
structure given by divinely-ordained natural laws. Without this, the structure and integrity
of the created order is threatened and it may raise additional issues for the problem of
evil. Second, if special divine action is to be causally efficacious, then some version of
Plantinga’s caveat must be introduced to allow for transcendent causal influences. For
quantum mechanics, the Born Rule is a natural place to include it. Third, divine action
must be placed within a larger metaphysical framework which includes a universe that is
open to transcendent causal influences without somehow violating, ignoring, or
suspending the nexus of natural causes. Furthermore, an interpretation of physical
theories, like quantum mechanics, that views the probabilities assigned to each outcome
by the theory as an approximation of the ontological propensities of how the system will
develop would also be a fruitful development.

Theological Underpinnings
It is necessary to specify the theological background within which divine action is
considered. Without this specificity, confusion and inconsistency may result. I will be

In terms of strategy, Murphy’s approach bears a number of similarities, “I have already suggested
that we view the statistical laws of quantum mechanics as summaries of patterns in God’s action upon
quantum entities and processes.” Murphy’s strategy to develop an underlying metaphysical framework
within which to understand natural laws and divine action is one I will also adopt. Nancey Murphy, “Divine
Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat,” in Philosophy, Science and Divine
Action, eds. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV,
2009), 289.
11
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working under the framework of theism, in which God is the personal, eternal,
transcendent, and good Creator of heaven and earth. God has personal relations with his
creatures; God is not a static, impersonal being from which creation emanates. God is
perfect in goodness; he is holy and perfect in self-giving love. In creation, God made a
universe that is incomprehensibly large, expansive, and contains living beings capable of
love, worship, and moral actions. God’s act of creation was not under any sort of
compulsion; it was an act he freely choose to do. Furthermore, God created a rational
order. He has designed the universe to have both regularity and consistency. Yet this
order, described by natural laws, is not so tight as to keep anything new from happening.
Creation is dynamic, a fruitful interplay of chance and regularity that produces a wide
diversity of created entities. God providentially guides the created order to its ultimate
fulfillment, which includes an eschatological transformation of all things, a new creation.
Within even this basic description of God and creation, there is significant debate on
how to interpret each affirmation. God’s eternal existence, providential action, and
foreknowledge of future events are of special interest. These are relevant to the
discussion of divine action because one’s position on them will shape one’s
understanding of how God relates to creation and guides it towards his intended goals. I
will not be able to definitively address these issues, but in the following pages I will map
out four positions for approaching God’s providence in relation to time and
indeterministic natural events (e.g. indeterministic interpretations of quantum
mechanics). Afterwards, I will choose one to serve as the theological basis for a noninterventionist divine action proposal, although there are ways to reformulate the
proposal to the other positions.
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There are various views on the nature of time, but I will break them down into two
categories based on whether they affirm temporal becoming as objective. The basic
question I am asking is whether time is dynamic or static; that is, whether there is an
objective moment that is the present. The block universe view of time is a prime example
of a view in which there is no objective becoming. In this view, all moments in time are
equally real; the past, present, and future all occur in one eternal now. The universe can
be thought of as a four-dimensional manifold that is unchanging. Time does not
objectively pass; the passage of time is only a subjective experience. The other category,
in which temporal becoming is objective, includes the presentist and the growing block
universe views of time. Presentism holds that only the present moment exists; the past
once existed and the future will exist, but only present objects actually exist. In the
growing block universe, the past and present moments exist, where the present moment is
the surface or outer boundary of the universe (the universe is understood as a fourdimensional manifold as in the block universe) that separates the non-existent future from
the existent past; this surface is always changing as time progresses. As the surface of the
universe (the present moment) moves forward in time, the universe “grows” as more
events become part of the determinate past. There are other positions on time (such as the
moving spotlight view), but these three will suffice for our purposes.12

An overview of these positions can be found in section 6 of Ned Markosian, “Time,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, last modified August 17, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/time/. For
more on Presentism see Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed.
Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 211-245. For a
critique of presentism and a defense of four-dimensionalist views of time (which include the block universe
and growing block universe views), see Michael C. Rea, “Four-Dimensionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Metaphysics, ed. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
246-280. For a defense of the growing block universe (and its compatibility with the theory of general
relativity) see George F.R. Ellis and Rituparno Goswami, “Spacetime and the Passage of Time,” in
12
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The relation of God’s providence to indeterministic events is a difficult problem
without decisive resolution. I will focus on two possibilities: God determines the outcome
of every indeterministic event and God does not determine the outcome of every
indeterministic event. The former option leads to a kind of divine determinism, although
one could affirm that God controls indeterministic natural events but not the
indeterministic actions of free agents.13 However, if God determines all non-agential
indeterministic events then there is no real spontaneity or randomness in the non-human
created order. This raises many questions for theodicy, since God will have had
deliberately caused every natural event (whether birth, sunlight, drought, storm, or
disease). If God does not determine every natural indeterministic event, then the nonhuman creation does have a degree of real spontaneity. God created the universe with
constraints on this spontaneity, but allows it to explore the possibilities within those
constraints. This view’s difficulties lie in how much openness God allows the created
order to possess. It raises questions of how much providential control God exerts over
creation, how God will achieve his ultimate goal for creation, and whether God has
foreknowledge of future indeterministic events.
On divine foreknowledge of future indeterminate events, the first view (God as alldetermining) can easily affirm that God knows the outcome of all such events because
God determines their outcomes. On the second view, there are different positions that can
be taken. If the block universe view of time is correct, so that all moments of time are
equally real, then God knows the outcomes of indeterministic future events because the

Springer Handbook of Spacetime, ed. Abhay Ashtekar and Vesselin Petkov (New York: Springer, 2014),
243-264.
13

In order to simplify the analysis I will not consider human free will and divine providence.
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future exists (and thus that moment is immediately present to God). In views of time with
objective temporal becoming, the answer is less obvious. One could argue that God
knows the outcome from some kind of intuitive sense, but it is unclear how this would
work because the outcome is not determinate until it occurs. The other option is that God
knows all the future possibilities of all indeterministic events, but since the outcomes of
those events are not determinate until they happen, God does not know the exact outcome
that will occur. This is not an imperfection in God’s knowledge. The nature of future
indeterminate events is such that it is not true that they will have a particular outcome
until the events themselves actually happen. If God’s knowledge of these events must be
perfect, then he will know them according to their indeterminate nature. However, there
are still various aspects of the future God can know determinately. For example, God
could partially determine events so as to achieve his purposes, or some event may occur
in all possible futures. Since God knows all the possibilities, it is not the case that some
future outcome would catch God by surprise or that he is incompetent to achieve his
purposes for the world, as God can anticipate any potential outcome.
From these options, I will construct four different approaches to providence and
time. The first is that God is all-determining and temporal becoming is objective. The
second is that God is all-determining and there is no temporal becoming. In both of these
approaches God has perfect foreknowledge of the future (at least of the non-human
created order) due to his all-determining action. The third view is that God is not alldetermining and temporal-becoming is not objective. Thus God has perfect
foreknowledge of the future due to his omnipresence and the determinate nature of all
moments of time (the past, present, and future are all equally real). In the fourth view,
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God is not all-determining and temporal becoming is objective. Here, God has definite
knowledge of the past and present, and perfectly knows the indefinite future possibilities.
However, since the future does not exist and is not determined, propositions of uncertain
future events are neither true nor false. Thus, they logically cannot be known in a definite
way because they are, by nature, indefinite. John Polkinghorne shares this view: God is
not a cosmic tyrant and temporal becoming is objective. Since God has created a world
that has true spontaneity, creativity, and temporal becoming, God allows the created
order to be itself while continually interacting with it. This is a prerequisite for the free
process defense,14 which is problematic as a defense if God determines the outcome of
every indeterministic event.
There is no decisive way to choose between these alternatives. The theory of
relativity is thought to favor a block universe (with no objective becoming), but the
growing block universe is also consistent with relativity15 and it is possible that relativity
is not a complete description of time. Furthermore, one of the most fundamental aspects
of human experience is that time seems to pass; if temporal becoming is not objective
then this experience is deceptive. God as all-determining raises thorny issues for
theodicy, although even if God does not determine everything that happens there is still a
divine responsibility for creating a system that allows for the possibility of evil. If God
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Another defense for the problem of evil that this view allows is the Creativity Defense, in which
God is the primary creative agent but has made creatures as secondary creative agents who participate in
creation. This kind of universe will inevitably have at least the possibility of evil. For an example of the
Creativity Defense see Terrence W. Tilley, “Towards a Creativity Defense of Belief in God in the Face of
Evil,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, ed. Nancey
Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, SJ (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory
Publications, 2007), 195-215.
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only knows future possibilities, then that may raise practical issues for how God acts
providentially.16 However, God could still act to ensure that his ultimate purposes will
not be frustrated. There are aspects of Christian practice and teachings that seem to
assume an open future and that God responds to what people do, such as petitionary
prayer and prophetic warnings. However, others may argue that petitionary prayers are
foreknown by God before the creation of the world and are accounted for providentially.
The choice one makes for these issues is undoubtedly important. There does not
seem to be a definitive way to choose a position, but in order to develop a more precise
account of divine action a choice will need to be made, however tentatively. Out of these
four approaches, I will work with the fourth; God is not all-determining and temporal
becoming is objective (specifically the growing block universe). The growing block
universe adequately captures the human experience of the passage of time and can more
easily integrate into general relativity than presentism. This approach also has potential
advantages for considering the problem of evil compared to God being all-determining
and has a natural way of approaching how God responds to the contingent actions of
human agents. It provides a way in which humans (and even the non-human creation) can
be said to participate in God’s act of creation, as we participate in the structure that is
finalized as the universe grows into the future. Furthermore, since this approach may
raise practical difficulties for providential actions, if a robust model for divine action can
work under this approach then it should work for the others when properly adapted.

This issue is forcefully raised in Timothy Sansbury, “The False Promise of Quantum Mechanics,”
Zygon 42, no. 1 (March 2007): 111–121.
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Choosing an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
I think that quantum mechanics offers the most plausible location for indeterminism,
since chaos theory, as it is currently understood, does not seem to be intrinsically
indeterministic. However, whether quantum mechanics supports indeterminism is
dependent upon the interpretation it is given. The interpretation chosen will also impact
underlying metaphysical assumptions, a vital aspect when assessing the plausibility of
non-interventionist special divine action. For example, if a deterministic interpretation is
the most plausible interpretation, then this will pose a potentially fatal obstacle to any
quantum divine action proposal. Given the importance of selecting an interpretation, it is
necessary to do so in a non-arbitrary manner. In the following pages I will consider
various interpretations of quantum mechanics, then select the one that seems most
plausible as both an interpretation in its own right and its potential for constructing a
quantum divine action proposal.
I will use various theoretical and metaphysical considerations as criteria to assess the
different interpretations of quantum mechanics.17 First, the interpretation should have as
broad of a theoretical and empirical scope as it can; it should be able to explain and
assign meaning to a wide range of phenomena. Second, it should not multiply physical or
theoretical entities beyond necessity, a criterion that is a variation of Occam’s razor.
Third, the interpretation should include as few ad hoc aspects as possible, thus avoiding
contrivance.18 Fourth, the interpretation should provide clarity, creating insight and

17
This list is largely based on the criteria given in Stoeger, “Epistemological and Ontological Issues
Arising from Quantum Theory,” 82–88.
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John Polkinghorne, Quantum Theory: A Very Short Introduction, Very Short Introductions 69
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88–89.
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further theoretical development. Fifth, it needs to be consistent with itself and other
physical theories (i.e. special relativity) and should correspond to classical physics under
the right approximations. Additionally, if the best interpretation is deterministic then this
will count against quantum special divine action. But if there is no clear way to
distinguish between a deterministic or indeterministic interpretation then the
indeterministic one will be chosen for constructing a non-interventionist proposal. With
these criteria, I will assess the following interpretations: Copenhagen, Objective Collapse
theories, Bohmian mechanics, Many-Worlds, and Consistent Histories.
The Copenhagen interpretation19 has historically been known as the “orthodox”
interpretation. Initially developed by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, the Copenhagen
interpretation is consistent with all empirical evidence and requires no theoretical
additions. The Copenhagen interpretation is indeterministic in that the outcome of a
measurement event can only be assigned probabilities from the wave function; the system
does not have a definite property until it is measured. This is referred to as the collapse of
the wave function. The Copenhagen interpretation has many strengths: it takes the
objective character of probability, indefiniteness, and wave/particle complementarity
seriously; it does not postulate more physical entities than necessary (there are no hidden
variables); and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is consistent with
special relativity.20 However, there are some weaknesses, including issues related to the
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A summary of the interpretation can be found in Roland Omnès, Understanding Quantum
Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 41–54. I have also introduced the Copenhagen
interpretation in the introduction and in the chapter on Robert John Russell’s work.
Stoeger, “Epistemological and Ontological Issues Arising from Quantum Theory,” 91–93. The
Copenhagen interpretation does imply nonlocal influences, which are in tension with special relativity.
However, since nonlocality cannot send information faster than light it is not considered to be contradictory
to special relativity.
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measurement problem and it requires the collapse of the wave function to be an intrinsic
part of the theory. Furthermore, there have already been quantum special divine action
proposals appealing to the Copenhagen interpretation. I consider many of these proposals
to be plausible, but there are some weaknesses. For example, these proposals can make
non-interventionist divine action episodic rather than continuous because indeterminism
is only located in the result of a wave function collapse.21
I have considered Objective Collapse theories, like the GRW collapse theory, in the
previous chapter on Alvin Plantinga’s proposal for divine action. In summary, in these
theories wave function collapse becomes a fundamental part of quantum mechanics by
modifying the dynamical equations themselves. The time when a collapse occurs and the
outcome of the wave function collapse are indeterministic, and a collapse can occur
without a measurement event taking place. The strength of this interpretation is that
measurements no longer play a fundamental role. However, there are difficulties that
prevent it from becoming a compelling interpretation. There is a degree of contrivance
involved; the theory introduces new physical constants whose values are chosen in order
to make the theory fit observations. It also modifies the dynamical equations of quantum
mechanics, but experimentally this modification is not necessary. Future experiments
may eventually offer evidential support for these modifications, but until then these
interpretations remain ad hoc.

21
John Polkinghorne, “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” in Philosophy, Science and Divine Action,
eds. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009),
103–104; John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998), 59–60.
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Bohmian mechanics is a hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics.22 In
Bohmian mechanics, the wave function (which evolves according to the Schrödinger
equation) does not fully describe the system; instead the positions of the particles are
introduced as hidden variables so that position is well-defined at every moment in time.
The wave function is used to define the velocity of a particle, and another equation, the
guiding equation, is applied to specify the motion the particle takes (the wave function
becomes a pilot wave, affecting the motion of the particle without being affected by the
particle itself). The result is that the particle moves deterministically and wave functions
and particles are split into two separate components. It is empirically equivalent to
standard nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Many find Bohmian mechanics’ realism to
be an appealing aspect of the theory.
There are two difficulties with Bohmian mechanics that prevent it from becoming a
compelling interpretation. First, it counts the wave function as a separate physical entity
from the particle it directs. This adds additional physical entities that are not necessary.
Second, Bohmian mechanics has major difficulties in accounting for relativistic effects; it
cannot yet account for what quantum field theory can explain.23 Thus, Bohmian
mechanics sacrifices theoretical adequacy and consistency with other physical theories.
There have been some tentative steps made in formulating a Bohmian version of quantum
field theory, but some of these introduce stochastic elements and thus may not be able to

James T. Cushing, “Determinism versus Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics: A ‘free’ Choice,” in
Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, Philip Clayton,
Kirk Wegter-McNelly, and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 2001), 99–110;
Omnès, Understanding Quantum Mechanics, 62–63; Sheldon Goldstein, “Bohmian Mechanics,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, Summer 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/.
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avoid indeterminism.24 As it stands, Bohmian mechanics does not offer a compelling
alternative to the standard Copenhagen interpretation.
The Many-Worlds family of interpretations are also examples of deterministic
interpretations of quantum mechanics. In these interpretations, a world is “the totality of
macroscopic objects: stars, cities, people, grains of sand, etc. in a definite classically
described state.”25 The formalism of quantum mechanics is taken seriously in that a wave
function is assigned to the universe, for which the Schrödinger equation describes the
evolution of, and each part of the wave function is physically realized in some world.
Randomness is thus completely removed because all possible states are actualized in
different worlds. The main advantage to this approach is that wave function collapse and
measurements are no longer fundamental parts of the theory. Thus, this interpretation is
theoretically simpler than even the Copenhagen interpretation. However, since different
quantum worlds cannot communicate with each other, this interpretation cannot be
confirmed experimentally. 26 It may remove some theoretical complexity, but it does so at
the cost of multiplying the number of physical entities to a potentially infinite number of
worlds in order to explain why one particular result is obtained in a measurement. As
such, it does not offer a compelling interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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The last interpretation I will consider is the Consistent Histories interpretation,
particularly as presented by Robert Griffiths.27 The Consistent Histories interpretation,
also called “Copenhagen done right,” requires that a description of any quantum system
must be constructed using a probabilistic sample space, or framework. Each sample space
consists of a family of histories (a history is a successive time-sequence of quantum
events, which can be any quantum property28 of the system at a particular time and is
mathematically represented by a projector), of which only one history will occur in a
given experiment. The histories in the same sample space are mutually exclusive. The
physical interpretation is that if a history is true, then the properties it assigns to the
system at each successive time accurately describe the system (the system has the
property P1 at time t1, P2 at t2…). When the family of histories meets particular
consistency conditions, probabilities can be assigned to each history in the family using a
generalization of the Born Rule. These consistency conditions become an axiomatic part
of the theory. Families that meet these consistency conditions are called consistent
families; only these families can assign meaningful probabilities to histories.
Perhaps one of the most perplexing aspects of this interpretation is that for any given
system there exist multiple families of histories that can be employed to describe the
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Robert Griffiths, “The Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics,” in The Stanford
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A physical property refers to something that is true or false about a particular physical system at a
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system. Some of these families are incompatible with each other; they are descriptions
that cannot be combined because they contain projectors that do not commute with each
other. This leads to another rule used in the Consistent Histories approach called the
single framework rule, which states that only one sample space can be used to describe a
quantum system at any given time and that two incompatible frameworks cannot be
combined. Incompatibility is not the same as being mutually exclusive; the different
descriptions cannot be combined into a single description but they cannot contradict each
other.29 This means the physicist can freely choose between different frameworks
depending on their utility for describing useful aspects of a quantum system because no
framework is more foundational than another. However, the physicist must be sure not to
combine incompatible frameworks into a single description of a quantum system.30
Griffiths suggests that incompatible descriptions are best thought of as referring to
different aspects of a quantum system; it is a characteristic of quantum mechanics that the
two aspects cannot enter a single description.31
There are a number of implications following from the Consistent Histories
approach. First, particles do not possess a precise momentum or position and the
precision they have is limited by the uncertainty principle. This is not because quantum
entities are undefined; it is because classical concepts like position and momentum can
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only be used in an approximate way. Second, the dynamical laws of quantum mechanics
are always stochastic, not just in measurement events. Measurements do not play a
fundamental role in this interpretation (it can be shown that a particle had the state
corresponding to the measurement before it was measured). The collapse of the wave
function is a useful approximation for calculating probabilities, not a physical process.
Thus, indeterminism is an irreducible part of this interpretation and is not limited to only
the outcome of measurements.32
Third, Consistent Histories implies that there is no universal, uniquely true
description of a physical system. Reality can be described in various alternative,
incompatible ways, but this does not lead to a kind of relativism. Reality is objective and
observer independent; choosing a different framework to describe a quantum system in
no way influences reality. Again, the multiplicity of frameworks is best thought of as
referring to different aspects of a single quantum system. It does not describe alternate
worlds or observer created realities. Fourth, Consistent Histories is compatible with
special relativity and quantum field theory. Even the motivation for nonlocal influences
disappears.33
Consistent Histories may offer a fruitful approach for relating quantum mechanics to
classical physics. The approach assumes that quantum mechanical laws are fundamental,
applying even to large systems described by classical physics. These issues have not been
fully resolved, but it is possible that there are histories corresponding to the properties
“the concept of measurement by which probabilities are introduced in standard quantum theory no
longer plays a fundamental role. Instead, all quantum time dependence is probabilistic (stochastic), with
probabilities given by the Born rule or its extensions.” Griffiths, “The Consistent Histories Approach to
Quantum Mechanics.”
32
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and behavior of macroscopic systems which have a probability that is close to one, thus
approximating the development of the system according to deterministic classical
physics. Furthermore, in some chaotic systems it may be the case that the probabilities
assigned to some behaviors are not close to one; this kind of system would be sensitive to
the amplification of indeterminate quantum effects.34
I believe that consistent histories is the best interpretation from which to proceed. It
is able to resolve many of the strange implications that arise from the Copenhagen
interpretation. It also does not require new physical processes or entities that cannot be
observed; it does not even require the collapse postulate as the Copenhagen interpretation
does. It is also theoretically adequate, as it is compatible with special relativity (arguably
more so than the Copenhagen interpretation since it does not contain nonlocal influences)
and can be extended into quantum field theory. The primary drawback is that it implies
there is no unique, exhaustive description of a physical system, as many will find this to
be contradictory to common sense. However, since it does not contradict the notion of an
objective, observer-independent reality I do not think this is an adequate reason to reject
the interpretation.

Summary and Concluding Remarks
There are difficulties with precisely defining an intervention with indeterministic
natural laws. Despite these difficulties, the best functional definition is that an
intervention somehow breaks the chain of natural causes or somehow violates the
regularities of the created order. In addition, there is a subset of events that would be
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classified as interventions for indeterministic laws: if an action A causes the future state
S(t*) of the system at time t* such that S(t*) is not a member of {Sa(t*)} or S(t*) does not
occur in accordance with the probability pa (where {Sa(t*), pa} is entailed by S(t) & (LN)
at an earlier time t), then action A is an intervention (INT). This raises a difficulty for
quantum special divine action. Two possible ways to overcome this difficulty is to assert
that God respects the overall stochastic pattern for an ensemble of events (with a
regularitarian view of natural laws) and to include a caveat, similar to Plantinga’s, that
the probabilistic laws only describe closed systems.35 Both ways can be incorporated into
one proposal as they are non-contradictory.
There are a number of ways to conceive of God’s relation to time and providential
action. I explored the different possibilities for the providential control God exercises
over creation (all-determining or open) and whether temporal becoming is objective. I did
not find a definitive reason to reject any of the possibilities. However, considerations of
theodicy, human experience of the passage of time, and petitionary prayer seem to favor
temporal becoming as objective and that God does not determine every natural
indeterministic event. This is in close agreement with Polkinghorne’s views of time,
providence, and omniscience. Even though I will adopt this position for the purposes of
this project, I will, at the appropriate times, reformulate the proposal into other positions
to see how they differ.
I will also adopt the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics for
constructing a non-interventionist proposal. This interpretation not only meets the
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requirement of indeterminism; it also has potential advantages compared to the standard
Copenhagen interpretation. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics, including
deterministic ones (e.g. Bohmian mechanics and the Many-Worlds interpretation), are not
compelling interpretations on empirical, metaphysical, or theoretical grounds. Consistent
histories also has great potential for constructing a non-interventionist quantum special
divine action proposal over the Copenhagen interpretation because measurements do not
play a fundamental role. Additionally, in the consistent histories interpretation reality is
objective and observer independent, although it implies there are multiple, incompatible
descriptions of the same physical system that cannot be combined into a single
description.

Chapter Six
Developing a Non-Interventionist Approach to Special Divine Action- Part Two:
Consistent Histories Quantum Divine Action

In this chapter I will construct a proposal for quantum divine action based on the
consistent histories interpretation. First, I will examine various theological and scientific
considerations for a non-interventionist special divine action proposal. Then I will list my
proposal for quantum divine action in a series of seven propositions, which I will expand
upon individually. Afterwards, I will consider the scope and potential limitations of the
proposal. I conclude that while this account is promising for a number of theological
considerations and has partial consonance with scientific theories, it is not a
comprehensive account of divine action, contains propositions that rely on specific
interpretations of scientific theories, and goes beyond what science can directly support.
Despite these inherent limitations, I believe it to be a plausible model of how God might
work providentially in the world in guiding creation history, interacting with embodied
agents, and even causing macroscopic change.

Scientific and Theological Requirements for Constructing a Model for Consistent
Histories Quantum Divine Action
Before attempting to construct a non-interventionist proposal for special divine
action that has consonance with science, I will need to briefly examine both theological
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and scientific requirements. Nancey Murphy’s approach took a similar strategy, 1 and I
will adopt many of her requirements. However, I will refrain from attempting to construct
a comprehensive metaphysical account of causation. I will also add a number of criteria,
followed by a summary of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The overall plausibility of the proposal will be affirmed by its ability to coherently
include both the theological and scientific requirements.
Theologically, the non-interventionist proposal should seek to be consistent with an
understanding of divine action as continuously sustaining, governing, and cooperating
with creation.2 In sustaining the created order, God continuously maintains creation’s
existence; for the most part this is not considered to be theologically or scientifically
problematic. In governing creation there is greater ambiguity, as the amount of control
which God exerts over indeterministic events is debated. In the previous chapter I argued
that God does not determine the outcome every indeterministic event, including quantum
events. However, God will act within the development of creation to ensure that his
ultimate purposes for creation will not be frustrated. God acts in cooperation with created
entities and processes, respecting their natural integrity and preserving the regularities of
the natural world. The proposal must allow for God to respond to petitionary prayer in a
causally efficacious manner and for God to act in extraordinary ways. It should also give
intelligibility to the claim that God has guided the natural processes active in creation

1
See Nancey Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrödinger’s Cat,” in
Philosophy, Science and Divine Action, eds. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert John Russell,
(Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009), 269-272.
2

Murphy shares this list although her proposal interprets governance and cooperation differently.
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history, allowing for creative input by God, while preserving the autonomy and
spontaneity of created entities in the unfolding of creation.
There are several scientific considerations for constructing a non-interventionist
proposal. First, the proposal must preserve the consistent, law-like evolution of
macroscopic objects, even though there is randomness at the microscopic level in
quantum events.3 Second, a proposal for non-interventionist divine action should not
undercut the practice of science. Science requires law-like behavior in order to describe
the natural world, as complete randomness would be impossible to predict. Third, one
must consider the nature of natural laws as existing independently of the created order (a
strong-ontological view) or as descriptions of regularities and relationships within nature
(a regularitarian perspective). I believe the regularitarian account is more plausible than a
strong-ontological approach. There is fundamentally no reason that compels us to accept
the laws as strong-ontological prescriptions of how the universe will behave.4 Finally, the
proposal should preserve a degree of autonomy for created entities and should clearly
recognize where empirical science ends and theological interpretation or extrapolation

According to Murphy, any account of divine action needs to “save the phenomena” in that “we are
setting out to explain how God and natural causes conspire to bring about the world as we know it.” Ibid.,
272-273.
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Vatican Observatory Publications, 1993), 207-234. Stoeger argues that “although the laws of nature do
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them the source of those regularities, much less attribute to them the physical necessity these regularities
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begins. The latter point is important in order to prevent science or theology from
imperializing the other and provide a clearer picture on the degree of consonance that can
exist between divine action and scientific theories.
I will construct the proposal with the consistent histories interpretation of quantum
mechanics, explored in the previous chapter. In review, the consistent histories
interpretation (as developed by Robert Griffiths)5 implies the following:
CH.1. Quantum time dependence is intrinsically stochastic; measurements are not
fundamental and thus randomness is not limited only to measurements.
a. The collapse of the wave function is a useful mathematical technique, not
a physical process.
b. Particles do not possess a precise momentum or position and the precision
they do is determined by the uncertainty principle; classical concepts like
position and momentum can only be used in an approximate way.
CH.2. A history is a successive time-sequence of quantum events, which can include
any quantum property of the system at a particular time.
CH.3. When a family of histories meets the consistency conditions, probabilities can
be assigned to each history in the family using a generalization of the Born Rule.
a. Only the families of histories meeting these consistency conditions can be
assigned meaningful probabilities.
CH.4. Classical mechanics is an approximation to the underlying quantum
mechanical laws in the correct conditions.
a. It is likely that there are quantum histories corresponding to macroscopic
properties of the system, which have a probability close to one, that
develop in a way that classical mechanics approximates.
CH.5. Reality is objective and observer independent, but there is no universal,
uniquely true description of a quantum system.
a. Incompatible frameworks cannot be combined; this is the single
framework rule.
b. Different descriptions will not derive contradictory results even if they are
incompatible. This ensures overall consistency.
c. The multiplicity of frameworks is best thought of as referring to different
aspects of a quantum system.

See Robert Griffiths, “The Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics,”; Robert Griffiths,
Consistent Quantum Theory.
5
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Consistent Histories Quantum Divine Action
In the following pages I will develop an account of quantum divine action that
allows for providentially significant divine action. I will call this proposal Consistent
Histories Quantum Divine Action (CHQDA). First, I will present CHQDA in seven
propositions. Afterwards, I will go into greater detail on each proposition and address
some of the potential issues raised by each proposition. I will also include brief
justifications for each proposition and its potential for consonance with scientific
developments.
1. God created the universe and sustains it in existence. God has created a natural
order which is open to his actions and creative input. In sustaining all things, God
maintains and respects the integrity of all created entities.
2. Indeterminism is an intrinsic aspect of physical reality; this is described by the
consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3. This indeterminism is metaphysically interpreted as a kind of openness to
transcendent (particularly divine) causes in addition to natural causes (which
include necessary but not sufficient causes for the outcomes of indeterministic
events).
4. The statistical regularities of the Born Rule in the consistent histories interpretation
describe the ontological propensity of a system to develop in a particular way
when there are no transcendent causes at work beyond creation and sustenance.
5. God could determine the outcome of all quantum time development by unilaterally
choosing how every quantum system will develop, but refrains to do so in order to
allow a genuine spontaneity and autonomy in the development of creation.
6. God continuously acts at each moment in time, guiding the development of
creation by selecting or forbidding different outcomes of quantum systems.
7. God’s actions generally respect the regularities of the created order. Special divine
action does not occur so frequently or drastically as to fundamentally change the
stochastic structure of creation.
(1.) God created the universe and sustains it in existence. God has created a natural
order which is open to his actions and creative input. In sustaining all things, God
maintains and respects the integrity of all created entities as themselves. This proposition
is broadly accepted within various monotheistic religious traditions, particularly the
Judeo-Christian tradition. The justification for this proposition therefore lies within the
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Christian tradition and the potential success of natural theology (which can seek
consonance with science). One may also find a degree of consonance with scientific
practice in that God allows for the possibility of science by creating and maintaining a
rational order. Furthermore, learning about created entities and their behavior is part of
learning about God’s creation and affirming its goodness.
(2.) Indeterminism is an intrinsic aspect of physical reality; this is described by the
consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics. I have argued that consistent
histories is not only a plausible interpretation, but that it is preferable to other
interpretations. Indeterminism is an intrinsic aspect of this interpretation (CH.1.); thus if
it is an accurate interpretation then this proposition has strong consonance with science.
However, it is important to note that one cannot, at this time, prove that any one
interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct. If quantum mechanics were to be
replaced or this interpretation falsified, then this proposal would likewise be falsified.
(3.) This indeterminism is metaphysically interpreted as a kind of openness to
transcendent (particularly divine) causes in addition to natural causes (which include
necessary but not sufficient causes for the outcomes of indeterministic events). This
interpretation of physical indeterminism is metaphysical in nature and is grounded in a
theology of creation and providence. The reasoning is that if there are no sufficient
natural causes for the development of a system then it is possible that a transcendent
being could act, in cooperation with natural causes, to guide the indeterministic evolution
of the system. Since natural causes are not ignored or violated and the result is allowed
by natural laws, this does not constitute an intervention. Interpreting the indeterminism
implied in the consistent histories interpretation (CH.1.) as an openness to transcendent
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divine causes is certainly beyond the scope of empirical science. Thus, this proposition
cannot claim full consonance with science, although it is consistent with it in the sense
that it incorporates scientific theories without contradiction.
(4.) The statistical regularities of the Born Rule in the consistent histories
interpretation describe the ontological propensity of a system to develop in a particular
way when there are no transcendent causes at work beyond creation and sustenance.
This is a variation of Plantinga’s caveat for natural laws. The empirical evidence
supporting quantum mechanics, interpreted through consistent histories, shows that the
statistical regularities predicted by the Born Rule (CH.3.) accurately describe the
obtained experimental results for quantum systems. This supports the first part of this
proposition. However, the caveat cannot be shown to be directly consonant with science.
Its justification lies within a theology of creation and providence and can, at most, be
consistent with scientific theories. It is this proposition that has the most tension with
existing science, as such transcendent causes would lead to results that differ from what
would be expected otherwise for individual events. However, given the underlying
metaphysical framework and a regularitarian view of natural laws, the tension with
existing science does not seem to defeat this kind of caveat.
(5.) God could determine the outcome of all quantum time development by
unilaterally choosing how every quantum system will develop, but refrains to do so in
order to allow a genuine spontaneity and autonomy in the development of creation. I
have discussed the possibilities for God’s control over indeterministic events in the
previous chapter. Those who wish to affirm divine unilateral control over quantum events
could easily modify this proposition to do so. However, I find it less problematic if God
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does not determine the outcome of all quantum events. First, this respects the stochastic
nature of creation that is suggested by many interpretations of quantum mechanics,
including consistent histories (CH.1. and CH.3.). Second, this gives a real spontaneity
and autonomy to the created order, although I must point out that this spontaneity is
allowed by God and operates according to the constraints he created for it. God knows all
the future possibilities and is never caught by surprise. Third, I think this kind of
spontaneity is necessary in order to preserve the free process defense of natural evil,
explored by John Polkinghorne.6 This proposition also allows for another degree of
consonance with science in that God respects the indeterministic and autonomous nature
of quantum entities that is suggested by science and encourages scientific investigation
because God allows created entities to be themselves. This allows for an interplay of
chance and regularity that leads to a fruitful history without writing out the possibility of
God’s creative input at particular times and places.
(6.) God continuously acts at each moment in time, guiding the development of
creation by selecting or forbidding different outcomes of quantum systems. This
proposition assumes the reality of temporal becoming. It could be modified for another
view of time in which there is no temporal becoming, and those who wish to affirm both
indeterminism and God’s foreknowledge of future events may be interested in doing so.7
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John Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1996), 82-87; John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World
(London: SPCK, 1989), 59-68.
7
In this case, God’s creative action could be thought of as a single decision where God has thought
through every conceivable possibility for how the universe could develop with its created nature. God
would choose how to respond in any of these situations, then create the universe as a four-dimensional
manifold with all aspects settled, even though the exact outcome was not determined until the divine
decision to create. Since God would be transcendent to this block universe, every moment of time would
appear equally real; and thus God has foreknowledge of the future by his immediate awareness of it.
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God, foreseeing all future possibilities given the present state of the universe, would
know which quantum histories will correspond to achieving his ultimate goals for
creation and any conceivable quantum histories that would frustrate his purposes. God
can then act, in history, to either select a quantum history that achieves a particular
purpose or forbid a quantum history that will frustrate his purposes (an irredeemable
quantum history). This guidance of creation allows for petitionary prayer in an organic
way, as God can respond to requests made to him. Furthermore, this guidance acts in
cooperation with created entities, as the creation is open to creative input by God as a
transcendent cause. This proposition also contains similarities with Polkinghorne’s
concept of active information in that God can non-energetically influence a physical
system to actualize a particular pattern formation or behavior.8 This proposition is beyond
the ability of current science to demonstrate, and so I do not think it is consonant with
science; instead its justification again lies a theology of creation and providence as well
as Christian religious practices.
(7.) God’s special actions generally respect the regularities of the created order.
Special divine action does not occur so frequently or drastically as to fundamentally
change the stochastic structure of creation. I have considered listing this proposition as
optional because, given the caveat of (4.), there does not seem to be a metaphysical
necessity for God’s special actions to preserve what typically would happen when God’s
action is beyond creation and sustenance. Regardless, natural laws describe a stochastic
structure for the universe; in order for CHQDA to remain non-interventionist, this
stochastic structure should not be violated. This proposition is not unprecedented, as
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Keith Ward, Robert John Russell, and John Polkinghorne have made similar caveats.
This proposition respects the regularities observed in nature, thus allowing for further
consonance between science and the proposal as a whole. However, when (4.) is
affirmed, the only difference between extraordinary acts occurring so readily as to
override or maintain the stochastic structure of creation is scale and frequency, which are
up to divine choice. This proposition is thus a matter of divine decision, and need not be
seen as a metaphysical constraint on divine action.
This leaves us with the question of whether CHQDA is an interventionist proposal. I
would argue that it is non-interventionist in the sense that the nexus of natural causes, the
integrity of created entities and processes, and the stochastic structure of creation (all of
which are described in natural laws) are not violated. Instead, God works through, within,
and in cooperation with created entities and processes in order to bring about the final
result without dictating every outcome. God’s creative input of this sort realizes potential
outcomes that were inherent to the system itself; thus it does not violate the nature of the
system or constitute a break in the chain of natural causes. A complete causal description
of the system’s evolution would require including God’s continuous action within it.
However, in another sense this proposal could be considered interventionist because
God’s action in shaping how a system develops could actualize a state of affairs that is
incomprehensibly unlikely and thus out of the ordinary from what would typically occur
had God not acted as he did. Such action could then be considered interventionist in that
it is outside the bounds of what would be considered a regular occurrence. In this
proposal, there is no sharp metaphysical distinction between action that is in keeping with
what occurs regularly and out of the ordinary; the only distinction is in scale. Whether we
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consider it interventionist or not then comes down to semantics: if interventionist is taken
to mean a violation of natural causes then it is non-interventionist, but if interventionist is
taken to mean any action that is out of the ordinary then it is interventionist unless a
strong version of (7.) is taken.9 As long as the stochastic structure of creation is respected
and natural causes are not violated, I consider CHQDA to be non-interventionist.

Scope and Limitations of CHQDA
With the proposal defined, I will now consider the scope it might allow for special
divine action and the possible limitations it faces. First, I will consider areas in which
quantum effects can affect the development of creation, particularly in cosmology,
biological evolution, and mental states. This is important in order for the model to give
intelligibility to the claim that God can be active in guiding the natural processes of
creation while respecting their created nature. Second, I will consider the possibility of
chaotic amplification of quantum effects and the relation of quantum processes to
macroscopic levels. Finally, I will consider the feasibility of miracles on CHQDA.
In previous chapters I have briefly discussed how some microscopic occurrences can
lead to significant changes on macroscopic scales. Some examples include devices like a
Geiger counter, electronic photo-amplifier, lasers, and the infamous Schrödinger’s cat
thought experiment.10 However, these are artificially constructed examples that would not
exist in nature; these are not sufficient by themselves for a robust account of divine

9

A distinction can be drawn between actions that are out of the ordinary (or simply unlikely) and
actions that are in violation of the stochastic structure of creation. If the latter sense is intended, then I
would definitively consider CHQDA a non-interventionist.
For an example of more effects, see Ellis, “Quantum Theory and the Macroscopic World,” in
Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, Philip Clayton,
Kirk Wegter-McNelly, and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 2001), 260-262.
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action. I will focus on two examples relevant for creation history: quantum effects in the
inflationary period of the early universe, genetic mutations, and mental states. Since these
affect the outcome of the large-scale structure of the universe and the biological
development of life, they are important to consider for any quantum divine action
proposal.
The origin of the universe’s large scale structure is an area of intense investigation in
cosmology. Gravitational effects can amplify small irregularities in the density of the
early universe, but it cannot create these initial differences. One of the most promising
explanations is that during the hypothetical inflationary period of the early universe
quantum fluctuations were caught up with the rapidly expanding universe, creating
irregularities in the universe’s density at larger scales. Afterwards, gravitational
instability acted on these irregularities, eventually leading to the formation of galaxies.11
Thus, there is good reason to think that even quantum fluctuations have made a
significant contribution to the large-scale structure of the universe. If this picture is
correct, then God’s action at the quantum level in this early period of the universe’s
history would have significant consequences for the large-scale structure of the universe.
Robert John Russell has already applied his Quantum NIODA proposal to the
possibility of special divine action at the level of genetic mutations.12 Some sources of
genetic variation may be the result of quantum effects. Possible examples include: “point
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mutations, including base-pair substitutions, insertions, deletions; spontaneous mutations,
including errors during DNA replication, repair, recombination; radiative physical
mutagens, including X-rays and ultraviolet light; and crossing over.”13 If this is the case,
it is conceivable that God could be active in the history of biological life in guiding
evolutionary processes without creating discontinuities in the chain of natural processes
or causes. In CHQDA, God could act as a transcendent cause to actualize a possible
outcome of the system in which the desired result (e.g. a certain beneficial mutation)
takes place. However, it does not require that God cause all mutations in this manner. If
God has given creation a degree of spontaneity and freedom to creation in order to
explore different possibilities, then it is likely that God has not determined the outcome
of every random mutation. Evolutionary history is not a linear path; it takes many
branches and turns, which creates a rich diversity of life. God can be understood as the
source of all evolutionary changes as the Creator and Sustainer of the natural order that
allows evolution to take place, no matter his role in individual mutation events.
There is a possibility that God could influence mental states through action at the
quantum level. George Ellis has explored this as a means through which God could
interact directly with conscious agents to offer revelatory spiritual and moral insight.14 If
God were to interact in such a way on embodied agents, it would have to include
interactions at a level where quantum effects impact the system. 15 Undoubtedly, the
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mind/body problem raises significant questions with the possibility of this kind of action;
it may also raise issues regarding free will. Further research is required in this area, such
as the nature of consciousness. However, in CHQDA, as long as there are quantum
histories which correspond to particular mental states (such as receiving spiritual insight
or moral conviction) that are dynamically allowed and do not interfere with the person’s
free will, it is conceivable that God could influence embodied agents through such
means.
Thus CHQDA appears to allow for divine creative input on the scales of
cosmological, biological, and conscious agents. This is already a fairly broad scope, but
can it also apply to other macroscopic systems? Other authors have entertained the
possibility that chaotic systems could amplify small quantum effects to have significant
impacts on the system as a whole. Even though the relation between quantum mechanics
and chaos theory is not well understood, the consistent histories interpretation may be of
assistance. In it, the same quantum mechanical laws apply to all systems, no matter the
scale; classical mechanics is only an approximation to quantum mechanics. On relating
the Consistent Histories interpretation to classical systems, Robert Griffiths explains:
The first task is to identify suitable quasiclassical frameworks, appropriate choices
of projective decompositions of the identity at a single time corresponding to
uncertainty of non-locality are factors that cannot be neglected and can in fact conceivably provide a modus
operandi without violation of any physical laws. This must then be done in whatever coordinated way is
required to effect the required results at the macroscopic scale… Note that this would not mean that God in
some sense calculates the effect of what would happen via specific neural stimulations and then delicately
one by one acts in just the right way in each neuron; rather we must see how we act downwards on our own
neurons. We think things, plan, imagine, and the delicate causal channels set up for that purpose convey
these interactions in such a way that the appropriate neurons fire as required. On this analogy we would
envisage God through the mode of transcendence planning certain pre-images, emotions, or whatever to be
made available to us. The appropriate communication channels which are in place by means of divine
immanence allow this intention to be communicated to the appropriate neurons, quantum uncertainty being
the feature that allows this to happen at any desired place and time without violating known physical laws.
Thus, we would envisage the conscious part of his/her intentional action being similar to ours: the intention
is formed consciously, the details take care of themselves.” Ibid., 342-343.
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macroscopic properties, together with suitable quantum histories that involve such
properties, with results which correspond closely to the time development of
classical physics… In such a situation it is plausible that there are families
containing quantum histories having a probability very close to 1, and which exhibit
a time development that closely approximates that of classical mechanics.16
On the possibility of chaotic systems being affected by quantum indeterminacy, Griffiths
continues:
One also expects to find cases in which the relevant quantum probabilities are not
close to 0 or 1; in particular in a regime where classical analysis predicts chaos
(positive Lyapunov exponents) quantum ‘fluctuations’ are likely to be amplified.
But this is also a situation in which the deterministic aspect of classical time
development is not to be taken too seriously, due to the sensitive dependence upon
initial conditions, so there is no reason to suppose that an appropriate quantum
description cannot be constructed, at least in principle.17
If there are chaotic systems sensitive to quantum indeterminacy, so that there is a
consistent family containing quantum histories that correspond to different macroscopic
properties, and if these quantum histories have non-zero probabilities, then God’s action
on the system so that the properties described by one of those histories would be realized
is conceivable in CHQDA. In fact, the proposal would not necessarily require chaotic
amplification. If God can actualize the properties, described in a quantum history, of a
system in cooperation with natural causes, then any quantum history that is dynamically
allowed (it has a non-zero probability) is within the scope of divine action envisioned in
CHQDA. Granted, most of these histories would have an incomprehensibly small chance
of occurring by chance (natural causes) alone.18 However, if they are dynamically
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allowed then theoretically there is no fundamental natural reason that they cannot occur.
Since God’s action is as a transcendent cause, then under proposition (4.) this would not
constitute an intervention in the sense of violating the causality of the created order. But
it would be out of the ordinary; something that would not occur regularly in nature. Thus,
there is some tension with proposition (7.), but as long as such incomprehensibly unlikely
events do not happen so frequently as to offset the stochastic structure of creation as a
whole, such action would not contradict proposition (7.).
The topic of miracles is tricky in relation to CHQDA. If miracles are defined as
simply special acts of God then they are certainly possible under it, but typically miracles
refer to extraordinary acts of God, particularly as remembered in religious texts and
traditions. Examples can include parting a sea (as in the Exodus), healings, exorcisms,
feeding 5,000 people with a few fish and loaves of bread, the resurrection of Jesus, and
an eschatological renewal of creation.19 It is important to note that many noninterventionist divine action proposals do not intend to explain these kinds of actions;
they remain an entirely different class of divine action.20 In the model I am proposing,
whether a miracle is within the scope of this kind of action depends on whether the
outcome, described by a quantum history, has a non-zero probability given the initial
conditions. Actions at the macroscopic level that only involve rearranging the matter

289. The same thing would be true in this case; there may be many allowed macroscopic properties for a
system that are not impossible under quantum mechanics, but they are never observed or would never occur
under normal circumstances due to the sheer unlikelihood of occurring. If any of these unlikely quantum
histories corresponding to a macroscopic outcome occur it would be due to the activity of a transcendent
cause, not chance.
19
It should be noted that the latter two are sometimes considered to be more than miracles. Many
consider them to be a whole category of divine action on their own.
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Russell notes that NIODA allows one to distinguish between objective divine providence and
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present, such as some healings or changes in weather (assuming these changes take place
over a period of time), may be possible under CHQDA; but they could be inconceivably
unlikely. Calculating probabilities for some miraculous events in an objective way is not
feasible due to the complexity of such events and the number of particles involved in
them. I would rather not strain the credibility of the proposal by forcing it to answer
questions it is not intended to answer.21 Furthermore, miracles involving more than the
rearrangement of untold numbers of subatomic particles are not explained by this
approach in principle. The resurrection of Jesus and eschatological renewal require a
transformation of the matter present; thus it is far beyond what could be explained in the
current proposal. CHQDA is therefore not a comprehensive account of special divine
action for those who wish to affirm many of the biblical miracles, the bodily resurrection
of Jesus, or the eschatological renewal of creation.22
Despite the difficulties in applying CHQDA to miraculous actions, it is possible to
seek out a metaphysically non-interventionist account of miracles. In Keith Ward’s
approach to miraculous action, miracles are not simply extraordinary acts of God or
violations of natural laws:
Miracles are not just anomalous events which interrupt the seamless processes of
nature. They are events transfigured by the active spiritual reality which discloses its
presence and purpose in them. they are not merely physically inexplicable events,
but astonishing and spiritually transforming signs of Divine presence, purpose and
power God brings such miracles about by a special intention to enable creatures to
come to a more conscious and dynamic relation with him… Objects are not at all
‘violated’ in their proper natures. They are, perhaps for one transfiguring moment,
21

There is also something wrongheaded about attempting to reduce miraculous events to divine
quantum manipulation. Miraculous events are far more than the kind of action described by CHQDA,
although this does not weaken whether the proposal is plausible as one way God may act.
22
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taken beyond their natural powers in order to foreshadow their supernatural meaning
and destiny. A miracle, as an extraordinary act of God, essentially has the character
of a communication, possessing an intended meaning which is to be discerned by
those who apprehend it in faith.23
Since miracles transcend the natural capacities of created entities, they are, by nature,
beyond the scope of CHQDA. However, this does not necessarily mean that the natures
of created entities are violated. Perhaps miracles can occur when natural entities are taken
up by God to make new realizations possible, allowing them to transcend their natural
capacities (as described by natural laws). Another possibility is that miracles “might be
the activation of latent features of natural objects that do not show up within the
theoretical framework of our existing natural sciences.”26 If so, miracles need not be
thought of as violating created entities, but as acting in cooperation with them. However,
this cannot find consonance with science because it is beyond the natural capacities of
physical systems that can be scientifically explored.

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have proposed that a model for divine action within the
indeterminism of quantum events, as described by the consistent histories interpretation,
can be constructed and offers a plausible way in which God can act in creation without
leading to a discontinuous break in natural causes. I have argued that special divine
action does not necessarily violate the natures of created entities and that quantum divine
action, described in CHQDA, can have a degree of consonance with science. However,
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this consonance is only partial; the model clearly goes beyond what science can offer
direct support for. It also requires very particular ways of interpreting scientifically
describable laws within a theistic worldview. The model is dependent on the consistent
histories interpretation of quantum mechanics, the openness of creation to transcendent
causes, and interpreting the statistical regularities described in quantum mechanics as an
approximation of how a system will develop without transcendent causes beyond
conservation. The latter two are beyond the scope of empirical science, but are plausible
under a theistic worldview.
CHQDA offers a potential way to give intelligibility to the claim that God is
continuously active in creation in order to guide it towards his purposes for it. God can be
active within the processes of cosmic and biological evolution, the formation of mental
states, and even at other macroscopic levels by working within the indeterminacy allowed
by quantum mechanics. Compared to other quantum based divine action proposals, I
believe the consistent histories interpretation offers two distinct advantages:
indeterminism is a fundamental part of quantum time development (not just during the
collapse of the wave function) and it relates quantum histories to macroscopic, classically
described systems. CHQDA thus allows for non-trivial special divine action, but it does
not contain the possibility for miraculous actions. This is not necessarily a fault of
CHQDA if it is not taken as a comprehensive account of divine action.
In conclusion, I believe the model offers an approach to divine action that is in
partial consonance with science. In no way does it “prove” that God acts in the world,
nor does it offer evidential support that God has actively guided creation history. What it
can offer is a coherent way that God can interact with creation and natural processes
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without violating their natural integrity as created entities or lead to a breakdown of
natural causes. Its explicit appeal to the consistent histories interpretation while
respecting the statistical regularities described therein as an intrinsic feature of quantum
systems (2. and 4.), its allowance for indeterministic quantum events to occur without
special divine input beyond creation and conservation (5.), and its inclusion that God
respects the stochastic structure of creation (7.) have varying degrees of consonance with
science.29 However, interpreting quantum indeterminism as allowing an openness to
transcendent causes (3.) and that these additional causes affect the development of
quantum systems (4.) are beyond the scope of science, although they are not in logical
contradiction with it. Since theological motivation exists for affirming a robust account of
divine action and the theological aspects of the propositions are not implausible, the
proposal as a whole should be taken as a plausible way in which God may interact with
creation.

29

If one also affirms that a strong case from natural theology can be made, then (1.) could also have a
degree of consonance with science (e.g. fine-tuning and the structure of the universe as life-permitting).

Chapter Seven
Summary, Conclusion, and Further Areas of Research

In John Polkinghorne’s proposal for special divine action, he appeals to the behavior
of chaotic systems, particularly their intrinsic unpredictability, as a pointer towards an
instance of ontological indeterminism. According to Polkinghorne, the possible
trajectories a chaotic system may take through state space are constrained by the
conservation of energy and strange attractors. He introduces the concept of active
information, which is “the influence that brings about the formation of a structured
pattern of future dynamical behaviour.”1 It is this active information that determines the
trajectory the system will follow out of the possible trajectories. Polkinghorne conceives
of special divine action as the input of active information rather than the input of energy.
In this way, God may guide creation’s development without turning to interventionism.
Despite the proposal’s creativity, there are a number of drawbacks. First, the
mathematical equations that give rise to strange attractors are deterministic;
unpredictability is an intrinsic feature of these deterministic equations and so it cannot be
taken to imply ontological indeterminism. Although to be fair, Polkinghorne’s proposal is
more sophisticated than simply equating unpredictability and indeterminism. He argues
that the chaotic equations are only approximations of indeterministic systems. Second,
the reliance of the proposal on the fractal structure of strange attractors places a strong
limitation on the scope of special divine action of this sort, as only systems described by
strange attractors are relevant to his proposal. Third, issues may arise when the
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trajectories through state space are applied to an infinite limit (so that the trajectories can
become arbitrarily close). Some chaotic systems, such as chemical systems described by
mathematically chaotic models, may not allow the trajectories to become arbitrarily
close. Further research into holistic chaos may vindicate aspects of Polkinghorne’s
proposal, but as it stands current chaos theory does not seem to directly support an
indeterministic understanding of chaotic systems.
In Robert John Russell’s NIODA project, he proposes the following criteria for
constructing a successful model of non-interventionist divine action:
For non-interventionist objective divine action to be intelligible in light of science,
the events that result from God’s action must occur within a domain of nature in
which the appropriate scientific theory can be interpreted philosophically in terms
of ontological indeterminism. The events must be considered as direct, mediated,
and objective acts of God.2
From this, Russell turns to quantum mechanics in an attempt to construct a proposal for
NIODA. He adopts a version of the Copenhagen interpretation, which implies that the
outcome of the collapse of the wave function is indeterministic. The probabilities for the
outcomes are given by the Born Rule, and the development of the wave function between
measurements is described deterministically by the Schrödinger equation. In this
approach, Russell argues that God is not one natural cause acting among others. This is
because there are no sufficient natural causes for the specific outcome that takes place in
the measurement event and so God’s action remains distinct from natural causes: “If God
acts together with nature to produce the event in which a radioactive nucleus decays, God
is not acting as a natural cause.”3 Other critiques question the scope of divine action

2

Russell, Cosmology, 125.

3

Ibid., 169.

117
allowed by this proposal. It seems to place a limitation on when God can act in this way,
making divine action episodic as it would only occur during the collapse of the wave
function. However, I do not believe this is a fair criticism; if wave function collapse
occurs frequently in nature then God may be able to influence many different systems
without violating natural laws. God would act continuously in conserving the existence of
all created entities, but act specially in the outcome of a wave function collapse (in
accordance with the statistical regularities described by the Born Rule).
Alvin Plantinga’s analysis of science and divine action and his proposal for quantum
divine action makes a significant contribution to the discussion. He considers the
objections against interventionism but finds them to be unconvincing. He also considers
divine action from the perspective of classical physics, noting that it is not classical
physics, but the Laplacean picture (which includes the causal closure of the universe) that
is in conflict with special divine action. He suggests a caveat for natural laws: they
“describe how the world works when, or provided that the world is a closed (isolated)
system, subject to no outside causal influence. In classical physics, the great conservation
laws deduced from Newton’s laws are stated for closed or isolated systems.”4 With this
caveat, natural laws are not violated by special divine action because a transcendent cause
is acting upon the system. I think this caveat is necessary to include in any special divine
action proposal; however, relying on it decreases the ability to find consonance between
special divine action and scientific theories.
In addition, Plantinga proposed an account of quantum special divine action based
on the objective collapse interpretation proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (GRW
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theory). In this interpretation, wave function collapse is not limited to measurements but
may occur naturally at random. Wave function collapse becomes a fundamental part of
quantum theory (the equations of standard quantum mechanics are modified). The
advantage of these objective collapse theories for special divine action is that it gives
practically limitless divine control over what occurs. God may collapse the wave function
at any point in time and the wave function could be localized at any place in the universe
(since these features are indeterministic in GRW theory). However, there are difficulties
with this interpretation of quantum mechanics: it introduces two new physical constants,
the wave function is never fully localized, and it requires modifications to existing
quantum mechanics. Later experiments may confirm objective collapse theories, but as it
stands I do not find it a compelling interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The Consistent Histories Quantum Divine Action Proposal
In chapter 6 I made seven propositions for a non-interventionist special divine action
proposal based on the consistent histories interpretation5 of quantum mechanics:
1. God created the universe and sustains it in existence. God has created a natural
order which is open to his actions and creative input. In sustaining all things, God
maintains and respects the integrity of all created entities.
2. Indeterminism is an intrinsic aspect of physical reality; this is described by the
consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3. This indeterminism is metaphysically interpreted as a kind of openness to
transcendent (particularly divine) causes in addition to natural causes (which
include necessary but not sufficient causes for the outcomes of indeterministic
events).
4. The statistical regularities of the Born Rule in the consistent histories interpretation
describe the ontological propensity of a system to develop in a particular way
when there are no transcendent causes at work beyond creation and sustenance.

5
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5. God could determine the outcome of all quantum time development by unilaterally
choosing how every quantum system will develop, but refrains to do so in order to
allow a genuine spontaneity and autonomy in the development of creation.
6. God continuously acts at each moment in time, guiding the development of
creation by selecting or forbidding different outcomes of quantum systems.
7. God’s actions generally respect the regularities of the created order. Special divine
action does not occur so frequently or drastically as to fundamentally change the
stochastic structure of creation.
These propositions are by no means incorrigible. Instead they are a suggestion for how to
best conceive of quantum-level divine action that allows for a strong degree of creative
input by God without making everything the result of divine determination. Some may
wish to modify propositions (5.) and (6.) if they have a different view on the extent of
divine determinism or the nature of time. Furthermore, these propositions are not derived
directly from science; they rely on a theological extrapolation of an interpretation of
scientific theories. CHQDA can at most offer partial consonance between science and a
theological account of divine action because there are aspects of CHQDA that are beyond
scientific confirmation.
The scope of divine action in CHQDA is arguably fairly broad. Unlike the
Copenhagen interpretation, indeterminism is an intrinsic part of the dynamics of a
quantum system at all times. Thus, God is continuously active in the history of creation to
guide its development, from the beginning to the present. Plausible areas of interaction
include quantum effects during the inflationary era, genetic mutations in biological
evolution, mental states, and macroscopic systems (particularly chaotic systems).
Miraculous action is beyond the scope of CHQDA because many miracles involve more
than simply rearranging matter at the atomic level, but rather its transformation as God
takes it up to allow it to transcend its natural capacities. CHQDA best approached as a
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non-comprehensive model of special divine action, leaving miraculous action as a
separate class of divine action.

Further Areas of Research
CHQDA explicitly depends on the consistent histories interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Therefore, the falsification of the consistent histories interpretation would
also falsify CHQDA. Interpretive issues facing quantum mechanics are relevant for the
plausibility of CHQDA, as further research may support or contradict the consistent
histories interpretation or offer support for other interpretations. There are other
indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics I did not investigate that may allow
for a similar approach to quantum special divine action, such as certain Modal
interpretations.6 In applying CHQDA to cosmological and biological history, mental
states, and macroscopic systems, more research may be necessary to confirm that
quantum effects can influence these systems in non-trivial ways.
The use of the consistent histories interpretation brings up another feature to
explore: the existence of multiple incompatible descriptions of a single quantum system.
The issue this may pose for special divine action is that some frameworks may not
include the effects of the particular action that God makes on the system. If a framework
includes quantum histories which describe the effects of the action, there may be an
incompatible framework which does not include these quantum histories (thus the
incompatible framework cannot assign a meaningful probability to these outcomes). This

See Olimpia Lombardi and Dennis Dieks, “Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University, March 6, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-modal/. The Modal Hamiltonian
interpretation appears to be the most promising.
6
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issue is not fatal. First, divine action would take place on the system itself, potentially
affecting which quantum histories are true in every description. Second, reality is
objective and observer-independent; one’s choice of framework does not influence
reality. Thus, if God did act the effects will be real whether the framework used to
describe the system contains histories that include the effects. Third, a framework will
not contradict the results of another incompatible framework. It only implies that the
results cannot be combined into a single description. Interestingly, this is related to
another issue requiring further research, which is the need for theological discernment. In
the consistent histories interpretation, a physicist may choose from any of the consistent
frameworks as long as incompatible frameworks are not combined. The choice of which
framework to use is based on which one best describes what the physicist is investigating.
Analogously, in theology the criteria for discernment or descriptions of divine action
could be chosen based on their ability to adequately describe God’s action, although it
does not necessarily preclude the possibility of any other approach.
Attention must be given to the theological criteria for discerning divine action in the
CHQDA proposal. Whether the outcome should be attributed to chance or deliberate
divine interaction is not directly measureable. An extreme example, such as God
coordinating trillions of particles to move in a highly improbable way to affect change in
a macroscopic system, would easily be discerned as an outcome that probably would not
have occurred by natural causes alone (although it does not contradict the natural causal
order if the outcome was dynamically allowed). In such a case, the action of a
transcendent cause would be difficult to deny. However, many cases of divine action in
CHQDA would be more subtle in their causal effects; a genetic mutation may be random
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or caused by God acting in cooperation with natural causes. This is especially true if a
strong version of proposition (7.) is adopted. If so, divine action of this sort must respect
the stochastic structure of creation; frequent divine action on a grand scale would alter
this stochastic structure. This discernment must take place within a faith tradition and in
the presence of the community embodying that tradition. In the Christian tradition,
discernment begins with a vision of the triune God as Creator and Redeemer.
Discernment will also be centered on the revelation of God found in Jesus’s life, death,
and resurrection; in the presence of the Holy Spirit; and within the church. Placing divine
action within a Trinitarian framework is also a promising future endeavor. 7
In order to form more comprehensive accounts of how God may interact with the
world, one must look beyond quantum physics and chaos theory. CHQDA is not a
comprehensive account of divine action, and further reflection on divine action is
necessary. Creation ex nihilo, miracles, and eschatological renewal are prime examples;
these are entirely different kinds of divine action that cannot be achieved by rearranging
subatomic particles. In the previous chapter I have included a brief reflection on miracles
and divine action, including a way to conceive of miraculous action. A potential area of
further research is in top-down and whole-part causality; these strategies may include
appealing to concepts such as emergence and supervenience.8
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The problem of evil raises a number of considerations for CHQDA. If God can act
without violating natural laws, then certain strategies for theodicy may be undermined.
This is because God can act to relieve more suffering without violating natural causes.
Concerns related to theodicy may also provide constraints on how we conceive of divine
action; it is difficult for many Christians to conceive of God deliberately planning every
incidence of cancer. Preserving a degree of autonomy and spontaneity for creation, which
CHQDA attempts, is a possible way to approach these considerations and it can preserve
both the free process and creativity defenses. Evil, whether natural or moral, is also
connected with eschatology; the faithfulness and justice of God are at stake if God does
not somehow deal with the evil that occurs.
There are a few ways one may pursue these issues. Much of the discussion centers
on whether gratuitous evil exists, as many have argued that God will not allow an evil
event to occur if it does not lead to some greater good. Perhaps a better approach is that
God does not allow irredeemable evil; God will not allow creation to reach a point that it
cannot be redeemed (that is, every evil situation that occurs can be redeemed by God
even if the individual evil itself does not lead to a greater good). A strong version of
proposition (7.) implies that the stochastic structure of creation is respected by God. If so,
God may act in any number of circumstances, but not to an extent that the structure of the
created order is violated. This stands in some tension with eschatological renewal, since it
involves a transformation of the created order, but that is another kind of divine action
altogether. It is also possible that God may intend creation to grow and mature through
natural processes; perhaps God is not interested in becoming a deus ex machina. God
may guide creation through these processes, but dictating every step, even to minimize
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the evil that might occur, must necessarily destroy spontaneity and autonomy for
creation. These possibilities do not constitute a full theodicy, but I think they provide a
number of constructive avenues to explore.

Final Assessment of CHQDA
In summary, I find that CHQDA offers a number of advantages over previous
quantum special divine action proposals. These advantages include that indeterminism is
not limited to the outcomes of measurements, it offers an organic way to conceive of how
action at the quantum level affects macroscopic systems, and it relies on an interpretation
that does not require ad hoc modifications to quantum theory (e.g. the objective collapse
theories) or unnecessary physical entities/processes (e.g. Bohmian mechanics and the
many worlds interpretation). CHQDA also ascribes a genuine spontaneity and autonomy
in the development of creation; God may objectively act to guide creation without
becoming all-determining. CHQDA also allows a broad, non-trivial degree of openness
in how much divine action may affect creation. Furthermore, CHQDA may be considered
non-interventionist in the sense that divine action, as it is conceived by the proposal, does
not violate the nature of created entities or constitute a break in natural causes and
respects the overall stochastic structure of creation. Instead, God cooperates with natural
causes to bring about the outcome. In these aspects, CHQDA provides a partial degree of
consonance between science and divine action.
CHQDA relies on a theological extrapolation from the consistent histories
interpretation of quantum mechanics. It interprets the indeterminism implied by
consistent histories as allowing an openness to transcendent causes. This is not entailed
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by the consistent histories interpretation, nor is this a necessary implication of the
scientific evidence. In addition, the statistical regularities implied by the Born Rule are
interpreted as describing the ontological propensity of a system to develop with a
particular history when there are no transcendent causes influencing the system beyond
creation and conservation. This interpretation is not an implication from the scientific
theory; it is a theological extrapolation from the scientific theory. CHQDA also leaves
many questions unanswered as to the extent to which God acts in guiding creation history
and whether certain miracles are within its scope of possible outcomes. Miracles that
involve a transformation, such as the transfiguration and resurrection of Jesus, are beyond
the scope of CHQDA.
Since CHQDA relies on theological extrapolations of scientific theories that are not
required by the scientific evidence, it can at most provide only partial consonance
between science and divine action. CHQDA is not a comprehensive account of divine
action for an orthodox Christian theology, but this is not detrimental to CHQDA as long
as it is not taken to be a comprehensive account of divine action. If it is conceived as an
auxiliary hypothesis rather than as part of the hard core of divine action, then it offers a
constructive proposal for relating providential divine action with our current scientific
knowledge. If later scientific theories or evidence falsify the consistent histories
interpretation, then CHQDA will also be falsified. However, it would not falsify the hard
core of divine action or its theological justifications. Thus, CHQDA gives one a coherent
way to affirm God’s creative input in creation’s development without requiring a
breakdown of natural causes while offering partial consonance with scientific theories.
Divine action will always remain beyond human classification, and it will always be
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shrouded in a degree of mystery. But if God has created a world in which he is living and
active, then we should not be surprised to find a causal order that is open to his influence.
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